Categories
Mil-Std-882E System Safety

Safety Assessment Techniques Overview

In Safety Assessment Techniques Overview we will look at how different analysis techniques can be woven together. How does one analysis feed into another? What do we need to get sufficient coverage to be confident that we’ve done enough?

Learning Objectives: Safety Assessment Techniques Overview

You will be able to:

  • List and ‘sequence’ the five types of risk analysis;
  • Describe how the types fit together as a whole;
  • Describe the benefits of each type of analysis;
  • Describe an example of each type of analysis;
  • Select analyses to meet your needs;
  • Design an analysis program for different applications; and
  • Understand issues driving the use of techniques and level of effort.

This is the ten-minute demo version of the full, 70-minute video.

Topics: Safety Assessment Techniques Overview

  • Overview of Sequence;
  • Hazard Identification;
  • Requirements Analysis;
  • Cause Analysis;
  • Consequence Analysis; and
  • Control Effectiveness Analysis.

Transcript: Safety Assessment Techniques Overview

Click Here to See the Transcript

Welcome to The Safety Artisan

I’m Simon, your host. And today we’ve got, quite a special subject.

I’m going to be talking about safety analysis techniques, and this is a special subject because it’s by special request from my friends at the University of Southern California. Thank you to them. And what we’re going to be doing in today’s session is an overview of these different techniques, their benefits and the options that you have for applying techniques in order to come up with a whole programme of analysis.

Let’s explain what I mean

What we’re going to get out of today is after this you will be able to list and sequence the five types of risk analysis, and it says sequence in inverted commas because, as we’ll see, it’s not quite as simple as just going through it once in sequence, and that’s it. We tend to reiterate, but anyway, there is a natural sequence to this stuff, and we’ll see what that is.

Secondly, you’ll be able to describe how these different types of analyses fit together and how they feed each other and complement each other. That’s very important. If we’re going to come up with a reasonable whole; we’re going to describe the benefits of each type of analysis.

I will provide at least one example of each type of analysis, sometimes more than one.

We’re going to talk about how you would select analyses to meet your needs when analysing a specific system. Because we don’t always need to do everything. We don’t always need to throw everything at the problem. some systems are simpler than others, and they don’t need, the whole works in order to get a decent result.

With that in mind, we’re going to be able to design an analysis programme for different applications or for different systems.

And finally, we’re going to understand the issues that drive the use of techniques and the level of effort. The level of rigour that we need to apply now, to set expectations. There’s no magic answer here. I can’t tell you that the amount of hours that you have to spend on a problem is X squared, plus whatever.

We can talk about the factors that drive it, but I cannot give you a nice cut and dried answer. It just doesn’t work like that.

Those were the learning objectives

What we’re going to talk about, we’re going to give an overview of the sequence and then I’m going to recap that at the end.

And then the five types of analyses we’re going to talk about in order hazard identification requirements, analysis, cause analysis or cause or analysis, consequence analysis and control, effectiveness, analysis or control, identification and effectiveness analysis.

I’m going to talk about a couple of other things during that, which will help us pull things together. But those are the five main types that I’m going to talk about. Those are the five types of analysis that I said you would be able to list.  We’ve covered one learning objective already.

I promised you we were going to look at the overview of the sequence.

And I think this is what pulls it all together and explains it powerfully. So the background to this is we’ve got, an accident or mishap sequence. Whatever you want to call it and we start with causes on the left and causes lead two a hazard, and then a has it can lead to multiple consequences.

That is what the bowtie here is representing. It’s showing that multiple causes can lead to a single hazard, and a single hazard can lead to multiple consequences.

Don’t worry too much about the bow tie. I’m not pushing that in particular, it’s a useful technique, but it’s not the only one. We’ll come onto that – that’s the background.

This is the accident sequence we’re trying to discover and understand.

I’m going to talk a lot about discovery and understanding

Yeah, typically, we will start with trying to identify hazards. There are techniques out there that will help us identify hazards associated with the system being used in a specific application, or purpose, in a specific operating environment.

Always bear in mind those three questions about the context, that help us to do this.

What’s the system? What are we using it for? and in what environment?

And if we change any of those things, then probably the hazards will change. But we start off to preliminary hazard identification, which is intended to identify hazards. Big, big arrow pointing at hazards, but also, inevitably, it will identify causes and consequences as well, because it’s not always clear. What is the hazard when you start? talking of discovery, we’re going to discover some stuff.

We may finally classify what we’re talking about later. we’re trying to discover hazards. In reality, we’re going to discover lots of stuff, but mainly we hope hazards, that’s stage one.

Now, then we’re actually going to step outside of the accident sequence itself. We’re going to do some requirements analysis, and the requirements analysis has to come after the PHIA because some safety requirements are driven by the presence of certain hazards.

If you’ve got a noise hazard somebody’s hearing might be affected, then regulations in multiple countries are going to require you to do certain things to monitor the noise. Let’s say or monitor the effect that it’s having on workers and put in place a program to handle that. The presence of certain hazards will drive certain requirements for safety controls or risk controls.

Then there are the broader requirements. Analysis of what does the law require, what the regulations require, codes of practise, etc. We’ll get onto that, and one of the things that requirements analysis is going to do is give us an initial stab of what we’ve got to have – certain controls because we’re required to. That’s a little bit of an aside in terms of the sequence, but it’s very, very important.

Thirdly, and, fourthly, once we’ve discovered some hazards, we’re going to need to understand what might cause those hazards and therefore how likely is the hazard to exist in particular circumstances, and then also think about the consequences that might arise from a hazard. And once we’ve explored those, we will be in a position to actually capture the risk.

 Because we will have some view on likelihood. And we would also have some view on the severity of consequences from considering the consequences. We’ll come onto that later.

Finally, having done all those other things, we will be in a position to take a much more systematic look at controls and say, we’ve got these causes. We’ve got these hazards. We’ve got these potential consequences.  What do I need to do to control this risk and prevent this accident sequence from playing out?

What I need to put in place to interrupt the accident sequence, and I’ve put the controls. The dashed lines indicate that we’ve got barriers to that accident sequence, and they are dashed because no control is perfect. (Other than gravity. But of course, if you turn your vehicle upside down, then gravity is working against you, so even gravity isn’t foolproof.)

No control is 100% effective

We need to just accept that and deal with that and understand. There is your overview of the sequence, and I’ve spent a bit of time talking about that because it is absolutely fundamental to everything you’re going to do.

But let’s move on and start to look at some of these individual types of techniques.

Which Safety Techniques do You Use? Leave a Comment below…

Categories
System Safety

The Safety Artisan is on Thinkific

I’m pleased to tell you that The Safety Artisan is on Thinkific!

Thinkific is a powerful and beautifully-presented online Learning Management System.  This will complement the existing Safety Artisan website.  

My first course will be ‘System Safety Assessment‘ with ten hours of instructional videos. The new course is here.

(Please note that this is the same course as my ‘Complete System Safety Analysis Bundle’ of 12 videos available here.  So, if you’ve already bought that – thanks very much – please don’t buy it again, as you already have all the material.)

What will the System Safety Assessment Course do for you?

Transcript of the Video

Read the Transcript Here:

Welcome to the System Safety Assessment course

In this course, you will gain knowledge, skills, and confidence.  You will gain knowledge of what is involved in system safety assessment.  The individual tasks and techniques you need to carry out.

But more importantly, how to put them together into a successful program and how to tailor all these different tasks keeping some, but leaving out others so that you get an efficient and effective safety program, no matter what application or what system you are working with.

So that’s the knowledge and the skills

You’ll also get the confidence to be able to get you started.  Now, there is no substitute for live face-to-face training and coaching.  But this format is much more accessible to you and much more reasonably priced.  So wherever you are in the world, whatever time and day you want to do your learning, you can access this course and you can gain confidence to get you started.

So if you’re worried about a job interview, what you’re going to say or you’re worried about how to do a job and there’s nobody around to help you.  Then this course will give you the confidence to get started and to be aware of the pitfalls before you begin.

So what makes me confident that I can help you?

Well, first of all, I’ve got 25 years of experience applying system safety.

And I’ve done that in the UK, in the United States, in Australia, and in the European Union.  I’ve seen a wide variety of legal jurisdictions that I’ve worked in.  Also, I’ve worked on a wide variety of systems.  I’ve worked on planes, trains, ships and submarines, software, and I.T. systems all kinds of stuff.

I’ve worked on some gigantic multibillion-dollar projects and some much smaller ones.  So I know how to pragmatically apply this stuff, at a reasonable scale without spending stupid amounts of money.

And in fact, as part of my job as a consultant, I spent half the time telling clients to do less and spend less and still get an effective result.  So that’s where I’m coming from.

I’ve also got experience teaching system safety in the classroom.  I’ve taught hundreds of students, from various different projects.  And now I have hundreds of online students, and I’m very pleased to be able to help all of those as well.

So that’s why I think that I can help you

And I hope that you will enjoy this course and get a lot out of it.  Thanks very much for considering The Safety Artisan.

What do you think of the new page?

Categories
System Safety

What is System Safety Engineering?

What is System Safety Engineering? System Safety Engineering does five things:

  1. Deals with the whole system, including software, data, people, and environment;
  2. Uses a systematic (rigorous) process;
  3. Concentrates on requirements (to cope with complexity);
  4. Considers safety early in the system life cycle; and
  5. Handles complexity cost-effectively and efficiently.
https://youtu.be/hse2M_ZeDzQ
Watch the Lesson Here.

System Safety Engineering: Transcript

What is system safety or system safety engineering? Well, as the name suggests, system safety is engineering safety in a systems-engineering context. Okay. So it’s safety that’s deliberately sat within a systems-engineering framework.

That drives everything about how we consider safety.  Like systems engineering in general, it follows systems theory. But I’m not going to talk about systems theory now. That’s a huge subject.

I’m not actually an expert in [the theory], but I’m going to talk about three practical things that I’ve observed from doing system safety for 25 years or so.

Consider the Whole System

First of all, we consider the system holistically. So it’s not just the technical stuff. It’s not just the hardware. It’s the software as well if there’s any software in the system.

It’s the operating environment around the system and what we’re doing with it, the functions that were asking it to do, all the applications that we’re putting it to, and we include the people who are using it. We include all the data that’s being used, all of the documentation, everything. So we are looking at the system as a whole in accordance with systems theory. That’s the first point.

A Systematic Process

The second point is that it is systematic from a process point of view.

We’re following a rigorous process whereby maybe we start with some sort of high-level requirements, and we think about in safety terms what could go wrong. And we think about all of our safety obligations, what we must do. And then we decompose that, break down the problem piece by piece, systematically down to a component level. And then we consider all of the components, and then we systematically integrate it all back together.

And what I’m kind of indicating is the V model, where we start at the top left-hand corner with our requirements. And then from our requirements, we think about, well, how are we going to demonstrate that we’ve met those requirements at the end of the process? And then we carry on going down the decomposing into more detail but also thinking about how we’re going to verify and validate that we’ve done what we needed to do at every stage when we integrate and come back up the other side.

So that’s the systematic part of the process.

Requirements

And then Thirdly, which are kind of hinted up already, is a big thing about requirements.

In systems engineering, we are talking about complex stuff. It’s hard to understand. It’s not a toaster. It’s not a simple commodity item, where we can just go, well, I want a toaster and everybody knows what a toaster does or should do and what it shouldn’t do. We want to want it to toast bread and other things, but we don’t want it to electrocute people.

You know what a toaster is. You don’t need to articulate the requirements of a toaster. But if it’s something more complicated, like a ship or a power station or a complex piece of information technology, you want to develop a big software system to do something, then that’s very complicated, and you need to consider the requirements in a systematic fashion, starting at the top level, thinking about big picture stuff, what’s the system and its boundaries, what does it interact with?  What do we want it to do?

Then we need to go to a lot of effort to rigorously decompose that and come up with requirements, which you then verify and validate at the end of the project – or preferably before to avoid surprises. That’s a big part of systems engineering, as we’re dealing with complexity, and systems safety evolved to fit in with systems engineering.  It uses all of those concepts, all of those are powerful levers to help us engineer safety into a system rather than just adding it on at the very end.

Think Safety from the Start

I guess that’s the fourth big point. We start to think about safety right at the beginning, at the top left-hand corner of the V, not just at the end, and then add it on and hope everything will be all right, because that doesn’t usually work. And that’s a very, usually a very expensive and ineffective way to do things.

So that’s another point that system safety engineering. We are engineering safety into the system early because that is a more cost-effective way of doing it.

Summary

To summarise system safety engineering, remember:

  • It’s systematic in terms of the way we think about the system and all of its parts;
  • It’s systematic in terms of the process, the way we approach the task and break down the tasks rigorously and put them back together; and
  • It borrows from systems engineering and systems theory in the way we consider requirements.

Those three things are system safety engineering. For more on system safety try the FAQ post and the system safety assessment page.

System Safety Engineering: Did I Miss Anything?

Categories
Mil-Std-882E System Safety

Learn How to Perform System Safety Analysis

In this ‘super post,’ you’re going to Learn How to Perform System Safety Analysis. I’m going to point you to twelve posts that explain each of the ten analysis tasks, the analysis process, and how to combine the tasks into a program!

Follow the links to sample and buy lessons on individual tasks. You can get discount deals on a bundle of three tasks, or all twelve.

Discounts

Click here for a half-price deal on the three essential tasks: Preliminary Hazard Identification, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and Safety Requirements Hazard Analysis.

Click here for a bumper deal on all twelve lessons:

  • System Safety Process;
  • Design your System Safety Program; and
  • All ten System Safety Analysis tasks.

Introduction

Military Standard 882, or Mil-Std-882 for short, is one of the most widely used system-safety standards. As the name implies, this standard is used on US military systems, but it has found its way, sometimes in disguise, into many other programs around the world. It’s been around for a long time and is now in its fifth incarnation: 882E.

Unfortunately, 882 has also been widely misunderstood and misapplied. This is probably not the fault of the standard and is just another facet of its popularity. The truth is that any standard can be applied blindly – no standard is a substitute for competent decision-making.

In this series of posts, we will: provide awareness of this standard; explain how to use it; and discuss how to manage, tailor, and implement it. Links to each training session and to each section of the standard are provided in the following sections.

Mil-Std-882E Training Sessions

System Safety Process, here

Photo by Bonneval Sebastien on Unsplash

In this full-length (50 minutes) video, you will learn to:

  • Know the system safety process according to Mil-Std-882E;
  • List and order the eight elements;
  • Understand how they are applied;
  • Skilfully apply system safety using realistic processes; and
  • Feel more confident dealing with multiple standards.

In System Safety Process, we look a the general requirements of Mil-Std-882E. We cover the Applicability of the 882E tasks; the General requirements; the Process with eight elements; and the application of process theory to the real world.

Design Your System Safety Analysis Program

Photo by Christina Morillo from Pexels

Learn how to Design a System Safety Program for any system in any application.

Learning Objectives. At the end of this course, you will be able to:

  • Define what a risk analysis program is;
  • List the hazard analysis tasks that make up a program;
  • Select tasks to meet your needs; and
  • Design a tailored risk analysis program for any application.

This lesson is available as part of the twelve-lesson bundle (see the bottom of this post) or you can get it as part of my ‘SSRAP’ course at Udemy here.

Analysis: 200-series Tasks

Preliminary Hazard Identification, Task 201

Identify Hazards.

In this video, we find out how to create a Preliminary Hazard List, the first step in safety assessment. We look at three classic complementary techniques to identify hazards and their pros and cons. This includes all the content from Task 201, and also practical insights from my 25 years of experience with Mil-Std-882.

Preliminary Hazard Analysis, Task 202

See More Clearly.

In this 45-minute session, The Safety Artisan looks at Preliminary Hazard Analysis, or PHA, which is Task 202 in Mil-Std-882E. We explore Task 202’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements. We also provide value-adding commentary and explain the issues with PHA – how to do it well and avoid the pitfalls.

System Requirements Hazard Analysis, Task 203

Law, Regulations, Codes of Practice, Guidance, Standards & Recognised Good Practice.

In this 45-minute session, The Safety Artisan looks at Safety Requirements Hazard Analysis, or SRHA, which is Task 203 in the Mil-Std-882E standard. We explore Task 203’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements. SRHA is an important and complex task, which needs to be done on several levels to be successful. This video explains the issues and discusses how to perform SRHA well.

Triple bundle Offer

Click here for a half-price deal on the three essential tasks: Preliminary Hazard Identification, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and Safety Requirements Hazard Analysis.

Sub-system Hazard Analysis, Task 204

Breaking it down to the constituent parts.

In this video lesson, The Safety Artisan looks at Sub-System Hazard Analysis, or SSHA, which is Task 204 in Mil-Std-882E. We explore Task 204’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements. We also provide value-adding commentary and explain the issues with SSHA – how to do it well and avoid the pitfalls.

System Hazard Analysis, Task 205

Putting the pieces of the puzzle together.

In this 45-minute session, The Safety Artisan looks at System Hazard Analysis, or SHA, which is Task 205 in Mil-Std-882E. We explore Task 205’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements. We also provide value-adding commentary, which explains SHA – how to use it to complement Sub-System Hazard Analysis (SSHA, Task 204) in order to get the maximum benefits for your System Safety Program.

Operating and Support Hazard Analysis, Task 206

Operate it, maintain it, supply it, dispose of it.

In this full-length session, The Safety Artisan looks at Operating & Support Hazard Analysis, or O&SHA, which is Task 206 in Mil-Std-882E. We explore Task 205’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements. We also provide value-adding commentary, which explains O&SHA: how to use it with other tasks; how to apply it effectively on different products; and some of the pitfalls to avoid. We refer to other lessons for specific tools and techniques, such as Human Factors analysis methods.

Health Hazard Analysis, Task 207

Hazards to human health are many and various.

In this full-length (55-minute) session, The Safety Artisan looks at Health Hazard Analysis, or HHA, which is Task 207 in Mil-Std-882E. We explore the aim, description, and contracting requirements of this complex Task, which covers: physical, chemical & biological hazards; Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT); ergonomics, aka Human Factors; the Operational Environment; and non/ionizing radiation. We outline how to implement Task 207 in compliance with Australian WHS. 

Functional Hazard Analysis, Task 208

Components where systemic failure dominates random failure.

In this full-length (40-minute) session, The Safety Artisan looks at Functional Hazard Analysis, or FHA, which is Task 208 in Mil-Std-882E. FHA analyses software, complex electronic hardware, and human interactions. We explore the aim, description, and contracting requirements of this Task, and provide extensive commentary on it. 

System-Of-Systems Hazard Analysis, Task 209

Existing systems are often combined to create a new capability.

In this full-length (38-minute) session, The Safety Artisan looks at Systems-of-Systems Hazard Analysis, or SoSHA, which is Task 209 in Mil-Std-882E. SoSHA analyses collections of systems, which are often put together to create a new capability, which is enabled by human brokering between the different systems. We explore the aim, description, and contracting requirements of this Task, and an extended example to illustrate SoSHA. (We refer to other lessons for special techniques for Human Factors analysis.)

Environmental Hazard Analysis, Task 210

Environmental requirements in the USA, UK, and Australia.

This is the full (one hour) session on Environmental Hazard Analysis (EHA), which is Task 210 in Mil-Std-882E. We explore the aim, task description, and contracting requirements of this Task, but this is only half the video. We then look at environmental requirements in the USA, UK, and Australia, before examining how to apply EHA in detail under the Australian/international regime. This uses my practical experience of applying EHA. 

Discounts

Click here for a half-price deal on the three essential tasks: Preliminary Hazard Identification, Preliminary Hazard Analysis, and Safety Requirements Hazard Analysis.

Click here for a bumper deal on all twelve lessons:

  • System Safety Process;
  • Design your System Safety Program; and
  • All ten System Safety Analysis tasks.
Categories
System Safety

FAQ on System Safety

In this FAQ on System Safety, I share some lessons that will explain the basics right through to more advanced topics!

The system safety concept calls for a risk management strategy based on identification, analysis of hazards and application of remedial controls using a systems-based approach.

Harold E. Roland; Brian Moriarty (1990). System Safety Engineering and Management.

In ‘Safety Concepts Part 1’, we look at the meaning of the term “safe”. This fundamental topic provides the foundation for all other safety topics, and it’s simple!

In this 45-minute free video, I discuss System Safety Principles, as set out by the US Federal Aviation Authority in their System Safety Handbook

In System Safety Programs, we learn how to Design a System Safety Program for any system in any application.

The Common System Safety Questions

To see them click here:

is system safety, system safety is, what’s system safety, what is system safety management, what is system safety assessment, what is a system safety program plan, what is safety system of work, [what is safe system of work], what’s system safety, which active safety system, why system safety, system safety faa, system safety management, system safety management plan, system safety mil std, system safety methodology, system safety mil-std-882d, system safety mil-std-882e, system safety program plan, system safety process, system safety ppt system safety principles, system safety perspective, system safety precedence, system safety analysis, system safety analysis handbook, system safety analysis techniques, system safety courses, system safety assessment.

System safety is a specialty within system engineering that supports program risk management. … The goal of System Safety is to optimize safety by the identification of safety related risks, eliminating or controlling them by design and/or procedures, based on acceptable system safety precedence.

FAA System Safety Handbook, Chapter 3: Principles of System Safety
December 30, 2000

If you don’t find what you want in this FAQ on Risk Management, there are plenty more lessons under Start Here and System Safety Analysis topics. Or just enter ‘system safety’ into the search function at the bottom of any page.

Categories
System Safety

Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 4

In ‘Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 4’, I want to talk about Consultancy, which is mostly what I’ve been doing for the last 20 years!

Consultancy

As I said near the beginning, I thought that in the software supportability team, we all wore the same uniform as our customers. We didn’t cost them anything. We were free. We could turn up and do a job. You would think that would be an easy sell, wouldn’t you?

Not a bit of it.  People want there to be an exchange of tokens. If we’re talking about psychology, if something doesn’t cost them anything, they think, well, it can’t be worth anything. So [how much] we pay for something really does affect our perception of whether it’s any good.

Photo by Cytonn Photography on Unsplash

So I had to go and learn a lot of sales and marketing type stuff in order to sell the benefits of bringing us in, because, of course, there was always an overhead of bringing new people into a program, particularly if they were going to start asking awkward questions, like how are we going to support this in service? How are we going to fix this? How is this going to work?

So I had to learn a whole new language and a whole new way of doing business and going out to customers and saying, we can help you, we can help you get a better result. Let’s do this. So that was something new to learn. We certainly didn’t talk about that at university.  Maybe you do more business focussed stuff these days. You can go and do a module, I don’t know, in management or whatever; very, very useful stuff, actually. It’s always good to be able to articulate the benefits of doing something because you’ve got to convince people to pay for it and make room for it.

Doing Too Little, or Too Much

And in safety, I’ve got two [kinds of] jobs.

First of all, I suppose it’s the obvious one. Sometimes you go and see a client, they’re not aware of what the law says they’re supposed to do or they’re not aware that there’s a standard or a regulation that says they’ve got to do something – so they’re not doing it. Maybe I go along and say, ah, look, you’ve got to do this. It’s the law. This is what we need to do.

Photo by Quino Al on Unsplash

Then, there’s a negotiation because the customer says, oh, you consultants, you’re just making up work so you can make more money. So you’ve got to be able to show people that there’s a benefit, even if it’s only not going to jail. There’s got to be a benefit. So you help the clients to do more in order to achieve success.

You Need to Do Less!

But actually, I spend just as much time advising clients to do less, because I see lots of clients doing things that appear good and sensible. Yes, they’re done with all the right motivation. But you look at what they’re doing and you say, well, this you’re spending all this money and time, but it’s not actually making a difference to the safety of the product or the process or whatever it is.

You’re chucking money away really, for very little or no effect.  Sometimes people are doing work that actually obscures safety. They dive into all this detail and go, well, actually, you’ve created all this data that’s got to be managed and that’s actually distracting you from this thing over here, which is the thing that’s really going to hurt people.

So, [often] I spend my time helping people to focus on what’s important and dump the comfort blanket, OK, because lots of times people are doing stuff because they’ve always done it that way, or it feels comforting to do something. And it’s really quite threatening to them to say, well, actually, you think you’re doing yourself a favor here, but it doesn’t actually work. And that’s quite a tough sell as well, getting people to do less.

Photo by Prateek Katyal on Unsplash

However, sometimes less is definitely more in terms of getting results.

Part 5 will follow next week!

New to System Safety? Then start here. There’s more about The Safety Artisan here. Subscribe for free regular emails here.

Categories
System Safety

Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 3

In ‘Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 3’ I continue talking about different kinds of Safety, moving onto…

Projects and Products

Then moving on to the project side, where teams of people were making sure a new aeroplane, a new radio, a new whatever it might be, was going to work in service; people were going to be able to use it, easily, support it, get it replaced or repaired if they had to. So it was a much more technical job – so lots of software, lots of people, lots of process and more people.

Moving to the software team was a big shock to me. It was accidental. It wasn’t a career move that I had chosen, but I enjoyed it when I got there.  For everything else in the Air Force, there was a rule. There was a process for doing this. There were rules for doing that. Everything was nailed down. When I went to the software team, I discovered there are no rules in software, there are only opinions.

The ‘H’ is software development is for ‘Happiness’

So straight away, it became a very people-focused job because if you didn’t know what you were doing, then you were a bit stuck.  I had to go through a learning curve, along with every other technician who was on the team. And the thing about software with it being intangible is that it becomes all about the process. If a physical piece of kit like the display screen isn’t working, it’s pretty obvious. It’s black, it’s blank, nothing is happening. It’s not always obvious that you’ve done something wrong with software when you’re developing it.

So we were very heavily reliant on process; again, people have got to decide what’s the right process for this job? What are we going to do? Who’s going to do it? Who’s able to do it? And it was interesting to suddenly move into this world where there were no rules and where there were some prima donnas.

Photo by Sandy Millar on Unsplash

We had a handful of really good programmers who could do just about anything with the aeroplane, and you had to make the best use of them without letting them get out of control.  Equally, you had people on the other end of the scale who’d been posted into the software team, who really did not want to be there. They wanted to get their hands dirty, fixing aeroplanes. That’s what they wanted to do. Interesting times.

From the software team, I moved on to big projects like Eurofighter, that’s when I got introduced to:

Systems Engineering

And I have no problem with plugging systems engineering because as a safety engineer, I know [that] if there is good systems engineering and good project management, I know my job is going to be so much easier. I’ve turned up on a number of projects as a consultant or whatever, and I say, OK, where’s the safety plan? And they say, oh, we want you to write it. OK, yeah, I can do that. Whereas the project management plan or where’s the systems engineering management plan?

If there isn’t one or it’s garbage – as it sometimes is – I’m sat there going, OK, my just my job just got ten times harder, because safety is an emergent property. So you can say a piece of kit is on or off. You can say it’s reliable, but you can’t tell whether it’s safe until you understand the context. What are you asking it to do in what environment? So unless you have something to give you that wider and bigger picture and put some discipline on the complexity, it’s very hard to get a good result.

Photo by Sam Moqadam on Unsplash

So systems engineering is absolutely key, and I’m always glad to work with the good systems engineer and all the artifacts that they’ve produced. That’s very important. So clarity in your documentation is very helpful. Being [involved], if you’re lucky, at the very beginning of a program, you’ve got an opportunity to design safety, and all the other qualities you want, into your product. You’ve got an opportunity to design in that stuff from the beginning and make sure it’s there, right there in the requirements.

Also, systems engineers doing the requirements, working out what needs to be done, what you need the product to do, and just as importantly, what you need it not to do, and then passing that on down the chain. That’s very important. And I put in the title “managing at a distance” because, unlike in the operations world where you can say “that’s broken, can you please go and fix it”.

Managing at a Distance

It’s not as direct as that.  You’re looking at your process, you’re looking at the documentation, you’re working with, again, lots and lots of people, not all of whom have the same motivation that you do.

Photo by Bonneval Sebastien on Unsplash

Industry wants to get paid. They want to do the minimum work to get paid, [in order] to maximize their profit. You want the best product you can get. The pilots want something that punches holes in the sky and looks flash and they don’t really care much about much else, because they’re quite inoculated to risk.

So you’ve got people with competing motivations and everything has got to be worked indirectly. You don’t get to control things directly. You’ve got to try and influence and put good things in place, in almost an act of faith that, [you put] good things in place and good things will result.  A good process will produce a good product. And most of the time that’s true. So (my last slide on work), I ended up doing consultancy, first internally and then externally.

Part 4 will follow next week!

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System Safety

Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 2

In ‘Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 2’ I move on to …

Different Kinds of Safety

So I’m going to talk a little bit about highlights, that I hope you’ll find useful.  I went straight from university into the Air Force and went from this kind of [academic] environment to heavy metal, basically.  I guess it’s obvious that wherever you are if you’re doing anything in industry, workplace health and safety is important because you can hurt people quite quickly. 

Workplace Health and Safety

In my very first job, we had people doing welding, high voltage electrics, heavy mechanical things; all [the equipment was] built out of centimeter-thick steel. It was tough stuff and people still managed to bend it. So the amount of energy that was rocking around there, you could very easily hurt people.  Even the painters – that sounds like a safe job, doesn’t it? – but aircraft paint at that time a cyanoacrylate. It was a compound of cyanide that we used to paint aeroplanes with.

All the painters and finishers had to wear head-to-toe protective equipment and breathing apparatus. If you’re giving people air to breathe, if you get that wrong, you can hurt people quite quickly. So even managing the hazards of the workplace introduced further hazards that all had to be very carefully controlled.

Photo by Ömer Yıldız on Unsplash

And because you’re in operations, all the decisions about what kind of risks and hazards you’re going to face, they’ve already been made long before.  Decisions that were made years ago, when a new plane or ship or whatever it was, was being bought and being introduced [into service]. Decisions made back then, sometimes without realizing it, meant that we were faced with handling certain hazards and you couldn’t get rid of them. You just had to manage them as best you could.

Overall, I think we did pretty well. Injuries were rare, despite the very exciting things that we were dealing with sometimes.  We didn’t have too many near misses – not that we heard about anyway. Nevertheless, that [risk] was always there in the background. You’re always trying to control these things and stop them from getting out of control.

One of the things about a workplace in operations and support, whether you’re running a fleet of aeroplanes or you’re servicing some kit for somebody else and then returning it to them, it tends to be quite a people-centric job. So, large groups of people doing the job, supervision, organization, all that kind of stuff.  And that can all seem very mundane, a lot of HR-type stuff. But it’s important and it’s got to be dealt with.

So the real world of managing people is a lot of logistics. Making sure that everybody you need is available to do the work, making sure that they’ve got all the kit, all the technical publications that tell them what to do, the information that they need.  It’s very different to university – a lot of seemingly mundane stuff – but it’s got to be got right because the consequences of stuffing up can be quite serious.

Safe Systems of Work

So moving on to some slightly different topics, when I got onto working with Aeroplanes, there was an emphasis on a safe system of work, because doing maintenance on a very complex aeroplane was quite an involved process and it had to be carefully controlled. So we would have what’s usually referred to as a Permit to Work system where you very tightly control what people are allowed to do to any particular plane. It doesn’t matter whether it’s a plane or a big piece of mining equipment or you’re sending people in to do maintenance on infrastructure; whatever it might be, you’ve got to make sure that the power is disconnected before people start pulling it apart, et cetera, et cetera.

Photo by Leon Dewiwje on Unsplash

And then when you put it back together again, you’ve got to make sure that there aren’t any bits leftover and everything works before you hand it back to the operators because they’re going to go and do some crazy stuff with it. You want to make sure that the plane works properly. So there was an awful lot of process in that. And in those days, it was a paperwork process. These days, I guess a lot would be computerized, but it’s still the same process.

If you muck up the process, it doesn’t matter whether [it is paper-based or not].  If you’ve got a rubbish process, you’re going to get rubbish results and it [computerization] doesn’t change that. You just stuff up more quickly because you’ve got a more powerful tool. And for certain things we had to take, I’ve called it special measures. In my case, we were a strike squadron, which meant our planes would carry nuclear weapons if they had to.

Special Processes for Special Risks

So if the Soviets charged across the border with 20,000 tanks and we couldn’t stop them, then it was time to use – we called them buckets of sunshine. Sounds nice, doesn’t it? Anyway, so there were some fairly particular processes and rules for looking after buckets of sunshine. And I’m glad to say we only ever used dummies. But when you when the convoy arrived and yours truly has to sign for the weapon and then the team starts loading it, then that does concentrate your mind as an engineer. I think I was twenty-two, twenty-three at the time.  

Photo by Oscar Ävalos on Unsplash

Somebody on [our Air Force] station stuffed up on the paperwork and got caught. So that was two careers of people my age, who I knew, that were destroyed straight away, just by not being too careful about what they were doing. So, yeah, that does concentrate the mind.  If you’re dealing with, let’s say you’re in a major hazard facility, you’re in a chemical plant where you’ve got perhaps thousands of tonnes of dangerous chemicals, there are some very special risk controls, which you have to make sure are going to work most of the time.

And finally, there is ‘airworthiness’: decisions about whether we could fly an aeroplane, even though some bits of it were not working. So that was a decision that I got to make once I got signed off to do it. But it’s a team job. You talk to the specialists who say, this bit of the aeroplane isn’t working, but it doesn’t matter as long as you don’t do “that”.

Photo by Eric Bruton on Unsplash

So you have to make sure that the pilots knew, OK, this isn’t working.  This is the practical effect from your [operator’s] point of view. So you don’t switch this thing on or rely on this thing working because it isn’t going to work. There were various decisions about [airworthiness] that were an exciting part of the job, which I really enjoyed.  That’s when you had to understand what you were doing, not on your own, because there were people who’d been there a lot longer than me.  But we had to make things work as best we could – that was life.

Part 3 will follow next week!

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System Safety

Reflections on a Career in Safety, Part 1

This is Part 1 of my ‘Reflections on a Career in Safety’, from “Safety for Systems Engineering and Industry Practice”, a lecture that I gave to the University of Adelaide in May 2021. My thanks to Dr. Kim Harvey for inviting me to do this and setting it up.

The Lecture, Part 1

Hi, everyone, my name Simon Di Nucci and I’m an engineer, I actually – it sounds cheesy – but I got into safety by accident. We’ll talk about that later. I was asked to talk a little bit about career stuff, some reflections on quite a long career in safety, engineering, and other things, and then some stuff that hopefully you will find interesting and useful about safety work in industry and working for government.

Context: my Career Summary

I’ve got three areas to talk about, operations and support, projects and product development, and consulting.

I have been on some very big projects, Eurofighter, Future Submarine Programme, and some others that have been huge multi-billion-dollar programs, but also some quite small ones as well. They’re just as interesting, sometimes more so. In the last few years, I’ve been working in consultancy. I have some reflections on those topics and some brief reflections on a career in safety.

Starting Out in the Air Force

So a little bit about my career to give you some context. I did 20 years in the Royal Air Force in the U.K., as you can tell from my accent, I’m not from around here. I started off fresh out of university, with a first degree in aerospace systems engineering. And then after my Air Force training, my first job was as an engineering manager on ground support equipment: in General Engineering Flight, it was called.

We had people looking after the electrical and hydraulic power rigs that the aircraft needed to be maintained on the ground. And we had painters and finishers and a couple of carpenters and a fabric worker and some metal workers and welders, that kind of stuff. So I went from a university where we were learning about all this high-tech stuff about what was yet to come in the aerospace industry. It was a bit of the opposite end to go to, a lot of heavy mechanical engineering that was quite simple.

And then after that, we had a bit of excitement because six weeks after I started, in my very first job, the Iraqis invaded Kuwait.  I didn’t go off to war, thank goodness, but some of my people did. We all got ready for that: a bit of excitement.

Photo by Jacek Dylag on Unsplash

After that, I did a couple of years on a squadron, on the front line. We were maintaining and fixing the aeroplanes and looking after operations. And then from there, I went for a complete change. Actually, I did three years on a software maintenance team and that was a very different job, which I’ll talk about later. I had the choice of two unpleasant postings that I really did not want, or I could go to the software maintenance team.

Into Software by accident as well!

I discovered a burning passion to do software to avoid going to these other places. And that’s how I ended up there. I had three, fantastic years there and really enjoyed that. Then, I was thinking of going somewhere down south to be in the UK, to be near family, but we went further north. That’s the way things happen in the military.

I got taken on as the rather grandly titled Systems and Software Specialist Officer on the Typhoon Field Team. The Eurofighter Typhoon wasn’t in service at that point. (That didn’t come in until 2003 when I was in my last Air Force job, actually.)  We had a big team of handpicked people who were there to try and make sure that the aircraft was supportable when it came into service.

One of the big things about the new aircraft was it had tons of software on board.  There were five million lines of code on board, which was a lot at the time, and a vast amount of data. It was a data hog; it ate vast amounts of data and it produced vast amounts of data and that all needed to be managed. It was on a scale beyond anything we’d seen before. So it was a big shock to the Air Force.

More Full-time Study

Photo by Mike from Pexels

Then after that, I was very fortunate.  (This is a picture of York, with the minister in the background.) I spent a year full-time doing the safety-critical systems engineering course at York, which was excellent.  It was a privilege to be able to have a year to do that full-time. I’ve watched a lot of people study part-time when they’ve got a job and a family, and it’s really tough. So I was very, very pleased that I got to do that.

After that, I went to do another software job where this time we were in a small team and we were trying to drive software supportability into new projects coming into service, all kinds of stuff, mainly aircraft, but also other things as well.  That was almost like an internal consultancy job. The only difference was we were free, which you would think would make it easier to sell our services. But the opposite is the case.

Finally, in my last Air Force job, I was part of the engineering authority looking after the Typhoon aircraft as it came into service, which is always a fun time. We just got the plane into service. And then one of the boxes that I was responsible for malfunctioned. So the undercarriage refused to come down on the plane, which is not what you want. We did it did get down safely in the end, but then the whole fleet was grounded and we had to fix the problem. So some more excitement there. Not always of the kind that you want, but there we go. So that took me up to 2006.

At that point, I transitioned out of the Air Force and I became a consultant

So, I always regarded consultants with a bit of suspicion up until then, and now I am one. I started off with a firm called QinetiQ, which is also over here. And I was doing safety mainly with the aviation team. But again, we did all sorts, vehicles, ships, network logistics stuff, all kinds of things. And then in 2012, I joined Frazer-Nash in order to come to Australia.

So we appeared in Australia in November 2012. And we’ve been here in Adelaide all almost all that time. And you can’t get rid of us now because we’re citizens. So you’re stuck with us. But it’s been lovely. We love Adelaide and really enjoy, again, the varied work here.

Adelaide CBD, photo by Simon Di Nucci

Part 2 will follow next week!

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Mil-Std-882E Safety Analysis System Safety

How to Understand Safety Standards

Learn How to Understand Safety Standards with this FREE session from The Safety Artisan.

In this module, Understanding Your Standard, we’re going to ask the question: Am I Doing the Right Thing, and am I Doing it Right? Standards are commonly used for many reasons. We need to understand our chosen system safety engineering standard, in order to know: the concepts, upon which it is based; what it was designed to do, why and for whom; which kinds of risk it addresses; what kinds of evidence it produces; and it’s advantages and disadvantages.

Understand Safety Standards : You’ll Learn to

  • List the hazard analysis tasks that make up a program; and
  • Describe the key attributes of Mil-Std-882E. 
Understanding Your Standard

Topics:  Understand Safety Standards

Aim: Am I Doing the Right Thing, and am I Doing it Right?

  • Standards: What and Why?
  • System Safety Engineering pedigree;
  • Advantages – systematic, comprehensive, etc:
  • Disadvantages – cost/schedule, complexity & quantity not quality.

Transcript: Understand Safety Standards

Click here for the Transcript on Understanding Safety Standards

In Module Three, we’re going to understand our Standard. The standard is the thing that we’re going to use to achieve things – the tool. And that’s important because tools designed to do certain things usually perform well. But they don’t always perform well on other things. So we’re going to ask ‘Are we doing the right thing?’ And ‘Are we doing it right?’

What and Why?

So, what are we going to do, and why are we doing it? First of all, the use of standards in safety is very common for lots of reasons. It helps us to have confidence that what we’re doing is good enough. We’ve met a standard of performance in the absolute sense. It helps us to say, ‘We’ve achieved standardization or commonality in what we’re doing’. And we can also use it to help us achieve a compromise. That can be a compromise across different stakeholders or across different organizations. And standardization gives us some of the other benefits as well. If we’re all doing the same thing rather than we’re all doing different things, it makes it easier to train staff. This is one example of how a standard helps.

However, we need to understand this tool that we’re going to use. What it does, what it’s designed to do, and what it is not designed to do. That’s important for any standard or any tool. In safety, it’s particularly important because safety is in many respects intangible. This is because we’re always looking to prevent a future problem from occurring. In the present, it’s a little bit abstract. It’s a bit intangible. So, we need to make sure that in concept what we’re doing makes sense and is coherent. That it works together. If we look at those five bullet points there, we need to understand the concept of each standard. We need to understand the basis of each one.

And they’re not all based on the same concept. Thus some of them are contradictory or incompatible. We need to understand the design of the standard. What the standard does, what the aim of the standard is, why it came into existence. And who brought it into existence. To do what for who – who’s the ultimate customer here?

And for risk analysis standards, we need to understand what kind of risks it addresses. Because the way you treat a financial risk might be very different from a safety risk. In the world of finance, you might have a portfolio of products, like loans. These products might have some risks associated with them. One or two loans might go bad and you might lose money on those. But as long as the whole portfolio is making money that might be acceptable to you. You might say, ‘I’m not worried about that 10% of my loans have gone south and all gone wrong. I’m still making plenty of profit out of the other 90%’. It doesn’t work that way with safety. You can’t say ‘It’s OK that I’ve killed a few people over here because all this a lot over here are still alive!’. It doesn’t work like that!

Also, what kind of evidence does the standard produce? Because in safety, we are very often working in a legal framework that requires us to do certain things. It requires us to achieve a certain level of safety and prove that we have done so. So, we need certain kinds of evidence. In different jurisdictions and different industries, some evidence is acceptable. Some are not. You need to know which is for your area.

And then finally, let’s think about the pros and cons of the standard, what does it do well? And what does it do not so well?

System Safety Pedigree

We’re going to look at a standard called Military Standard 882E. Many decades ago, this standard developed was created by the US government and military to help them bring into service complex-cutting edge military equipment. Equipment that was always on the cutting edge. That pushed the limits of what you could achieve in performance.

That’s a lot of complexity. Lots of critical weapon systems, and so forth. And they needed something that could cope with all that complexity. It’s a system safety engineering standard. It’s used by engineers, but also by many other specialists. As I said, it’s got a background from military systems. These days you find these principles used pretty much everywhere. So, all the approaches to System Safety that 882 introduced are in other standards. They are also in other countries.

It addresses risks to people, equipment, and the environment, as we heard earlier. And because it’s an American standard, it’s about system safety. It’s very much about identifying requirements. What do we need to happen to get safety? To do that, it produces lots of requirements. It performs analyses in all those requirements and generates further requirements. And it produces requirements for test evidence. We then need to fulfill these requirements. It’s got several important advantages and disadvantages. We’re going to discuss these in the next few slides.

Comprehensive Analysis

Before we get to that, we need to look at the key feature of this standard. The strengths and weaknesses of this standard come from its comprehensive analysis. And the chart (see the slide) is meant to show how we are looking at the system from lots of different perspectives. (It’s not meant to be some arcane religious symbol!) So, we’re looking at a system from 10 different perspectives, in 10 different ways.

Going around clockwise, we’ve got these ten different hazard analysis tasks. First of all, we start off with preliminary hazard identification. Then preliminary hazard analysis. We do some system requirements hazard analysis. So, we identify the safety requirements that the system is going to meet so that we are safe. We look at subsystem and system hazard analysis. At operating and support hazard analysis – people working with the system. Number seven, we look at health hazard analysis – Can the system cause health problems for people? Functional hazard analysis, which is all about what it does. We’re thinking of sort of source software and data-driven functionality. Maybe there’s no physical system, but it does stuff. It delivers benefits or risks. System of systems hazard analysis – we could have lots of different and/or complex systems interacting. And then finally, the tenth one – environmental hazard analysis.

If we use all these perspectives to examine the system, we get a comprehensive analysis of the system. From this analysis, we should be confident that we have identified everything we need to. All the hazards and all the safety requirements that we need to identify. Then we can confidently deliver an appropriate safe system. We can do this even if the system is extremely complex. The standard is designed to deal with big, complex cutting-edge systems.

Advantages #1

In fact, as we move on to advantages, that’s the number one advantage of this standard. If we use it and we use all 10 of those tasks, we can cope with the largest and the most demanding programs. I spent much of my career working on the Eurofighter Typhoon. It was a multi-billion-dollar program. It cost hundreds of billions of dollars, four different nations worked together on it. We used a derivative of Mil. Standard 882 to look at safety and analyze it. And it coped. It was powerful enough to deal with that gigantic program. I spent 13 years of my life on and off on that program so I’d like to think that I know my stuff when we’re talking about this.

As we’ve already said, it’s a systematic approach to safety. Systems, safety, engineering. And we can start very early. We can start with early requirements – discovery. We don’t even need a design – we know that we have a need. So we can think about those needs and analyze them.

And it can cover us right through until final disposal. And it covers all kinds of elements that you might find in a system. Remember our definition of ‘system’? It’s something that consists of hardware, software, data, human beings, etc. The standard can cope with all the elements of a system. In fact, it’s designed into the standard. It was specifically designed to look at all those different elements. Then to get different insights from those elements. It’s designed to get that comprehensive coverage. It’s really good at what it does. And it involves, not just engineers, but people from all kinds of other disciplines. Including operators, maintainers, etc, etc.

I came from a maintenance background. I was either directly or indirectly supporting operators. I was responsible for trying to help them get the best out of their system. Again, that’s a very familiar world to me. And rigorous standards like this can help us to think rigorously about what we’re doing. And so get results even in the presence of great complexity, which is not always a given, I must say.

So, we can be confident by applying the standard. We know that we’re going to get a comprehensive and thorough analysis. This assures us that what we’re doing is good.

Advantages #2

So, there’s another set of advantages. I’ve already mentioned that we get assurance. Assurance is ‘justified confidence’. So we can have high confidence that all reasonably foreseeable hazards will be identified and analyzed. And if you’re in a legal jurisdiction where you are required to hit a target, this is going to help you hit that target.

The standard was also designed for use in contracts. It’s designed to be applied to big programs. We’d define that as where we are doing the development of complex high-performance systems. So, there are a lot of risks. It’s designed to cope with those risks.

Finally, the standard also includes requirements for contracting, for interfaces with other systems, for interfaces with systems engineering. This is very important for a variety of disciplines. It’s important for other engineering and technical disciplines. It’s important for non-technical disciplines and for analysis and recordkeeping. Again, all these things are important, whether it is for legal reasons or not. We need to do recordkeeping. We need to liaise with other people and consult with them. There are legal requirements for that in many countries. This standard is going to help us do all those things.

But, of course, in a standard everything has pros and cons and Mil. Standard 882 is no exception. So, let’s look at some of the disadvantages.

Disadvantages #1

First of all, a full system safety program might be overkill for the system that you want to use, or that you want to analyze.  The Cold War, thank goodness, is over; generally speaking, we’re not in the business of developing cutting-edge high-performance killing machines that cost billions and billions of dollars and are very, very risky. These days, we tend to reduce program risk and cost by using off-the-shelf stuff and modifying it. Whether that be for military systems, infrastructure in the chemical industry, transportation, whatever it might be. Very much these days we have a family of products and we reuse them in different ways. We mix and match to get the results that we want.

And of course, all this comprehensive analysis is not cheap and it’s not quick. It may be that you’ve got a program that is schedule-constrained. Or you want to constrain the cost and you cannot afford the time and money to throw a full 882 program at it. So, that’s a disadvantage.

The second family of problems is that these kinds of safety standards have often been applied prescriptively. The customer would often say, ‘Go away and go and do this. I’m going to tell you what to do based on what I think reduces my risk’. Or at least it covers their backside. So, contractors got used to being told to do certain things by purchasers and customers. The customers didn’t understand the standards that they were applying and insisting upon. So, the customers did not understand how to tailor a safety standard to get the result that they wanted. So they asked for dumb things or things that didn’t add value. And the contractors got used to working in that kind of environment. They got used to being told what to do and doing it because they wouldn’t get paid if they didn’t. So, you can’t really blame them.

But that’s not great, OK? That can result in poor behaviors. You can waste a lot of time and money doing stuff that doesn’t actually add value. And everybody recognizes that it doesn’t add value. So you end up bringing the whole safety program into disrepute and people treat it cynically. They treat it as a box-ticking exercise. They don’t apply creativity and imagination to it. Much less determination and persistence. And that’s what you need for a good effective system safety program. You need creativity. You need imagination. You need people to be persistent and dedicated to doing a good job. You need that rigor so that you can have the confidence that you’re doing a good job because it’s intangible.

Disadvantages #2

Let’s move onto the second kind of family of disadvantages. And this is the one that I’ve seen the most, actually, in the real world. If you do all 10 tasks and even if you don’t do all 10, you can create too many hazards. If you recall the graphic from earlier, we have 10 tasks. Each task looks at the system from a different angle. What you can get is lots and lots of duplication in hazard identification. You can have essentially the same hazards identified over and over again in each task. And there’s a problem with that, in two ways.

First of all, quality suffers. We end up with a fragmented picture of hazards. We end up with lots and lots of hazards in the hazard log, but not only that. We get fragments of hazards rather than the real thing. Remember I said those tests for what a hazard really is? Very often you can get causes masquerading as hazards. Or other things that that exacerbating factors that make things worse. They’re not a hazard in their own right, but they get recorded as hazards. And that problem results in people being unable to see the big picture of risk. So that undermines what we’re trying to do. And as I say, we get lots of things misidentified and thrown into the pot. This also distracts people. You end up putting effort into managing things that don’t make a difference to safety. They don’t need to be managed. Those are the quality problems.

And then there are quantity problems. And from personal experience, having too many hazards is a problem in itself.  I’ve worked on large programs where we were managing 250 hazards or thereabouts. That is challenging even with a sizable, dedicated team. That is a lot of work in trying to manage that number of hazards effectively. And there’s always the danger that it will slide into becoming a box-ticking exercise. Superficial at best.

I’ve also seen projects that have two and a half thousand hazards or even 4000 hazards in the hazard log. Now, once you get up to that level, that is completely unmanageable. People who have thousands of hazards in a hazard log and they think they’re managing safety are kidding themselves. They don’t understand what safety is if they think that’s going to work. So, you end up with all these items in your hazard log, which become a massive administrative burden. So people end up taking shortcuts and the real hazards are lost. The real issues that you want to focus on are lost in the sea of detail that nobody will ever understand. You won’t be able to control them.

Unfortunately, Mil. Standard 882 is good at generating these grotesque numbers of hazards. If you don’t know how to use the standard and don’t actively manage this issue, it gets to this stage. It can go and does go, badly wrong. This is particularly true on very big programs. And you really need clarity on big projects.

Summary of Module

Let’s summarize what we’ve done with this module. The aim was to help us understand whether we’re doing the right thing and whether we’ve done it right. And standards are terrific for helping us to do that. They help us to ensure we’re doing the right thing. That we’re looking at the right things. And they help us to ensure that we’re doing it rigorously and repeatedly. All the good quality things that we want. And Mil. Standard 882E that we’re looking at is a system safety engineering standard. So it’s designed to deal with complexity and high-performance and high-risk. And it’s got a great pedigree. It’s been around for a long time.

Now that gives advantages. So, we have a system safety program with this standard that helps us to deal with complexity. That can cope with big programs, with lots of risks. That’s great.

The disadvantages of this standard are that if we don’t know how to tailor or manage it properly, it can cost a lot of money. It can take a lot of time to give results which can cause problems for the program. And ultimately, you can accidentally ignore safety if you don’t deliver on time. And it can generate complexity. And it can generate a quantity of data that is so great that it actually undermines the quality of the data. It undermines what we’re trying to achieve. In that, we get a fragmented picture in which we can’t see the true risks. And so we can’t manage them effectively. If we get it wrong with this standard, we can get it really wrong. And that brings us to the end of this module.

This is Module 3 of SSRAP

This is Module 3 from the System Safety Risk Assessment Program (SSRAP) Course. Risk Analysis Programs – Design a System Safety Program for any system in any application. You can access the full course here.

You can find more introductory lessons at Start Here.