Categories
Course System Safety

Birthday to Black Friday

From Birthday to Black Friday, let’s celebrate The Safety Artisan’s Fourth Birthday with Big Discounts and a New Learning Community!

September 1st, 2023 is The Safety Artisan’s Fourth Birthday. To celebrate this, I’m running some great discounts and creating a new learning community.

As we run up to Black Friday, there will be great new deals coming out regularly, so bookmark this page. Okay, so we’re starting a little early, but I think that prior preparation promotes prime performance. Read on…

System Safety Assessment Course: Discount

It includes thirteen full-length videos (40 to 70 minutes each), as follows:

  • System Safety Process;
  • Tailoring your System Safety Analyses for any program;
  • Safety Assessment Techniques Overview;
  • Preliminary Hazard Identification (Task 201);
  • Preliminary Hazard Analysis (Task 202);
  • Safety Requirements Hazard Analysis (Task 203);
  • Sub-System Hazard Analysis (Task 204);
  • System Hazard Analysis (Task 205);
  • Operating & Support Hazard Analysis (Task 206);
  • Health Hazard Analysis (Task 207);
  • Functional Hazard Analysis (Task 208);
  • System-of-Systems Hazard Analysis (Task 209); and
  • Environmental Hazard Analysis (Task 210);

For a more detailed course description see How to Perform System Safety Analysis.

The course ‘Perform System Safety Assessment iaw Mil-Std-882E’ of 13 videos would normally cost $545 (US), but you can buy this bundle for $234 (US)! Follow this link and use code “SSA-311-OFF”.

A New Learning Community

The System Safety Engineering Academy is here! Normally $45 US per month (7 days free trial), but get one month free with code “one-month-free”.

It gives students the flexibility and convenience of online learning they want. Their favorite features of online delivery are:

  1. Recording classes and making them available to watch later.
  2. Easy access to online study materials.
  3. The flexibility that enables students to work and study.

I’ve decided to offer courses in a learning community that fully supports learners. These courses still offer the same dynamic content, based on my real-world career experience:

  • Up-to-date content from a current safety practitioner.
  • A structured course, based on widely-recognized standards.
  • Relevance – pragmatic advice based on real examples.
  • Regular webinars and Q&A sessions with me.
  • Email support to help you overcome common challenges.
  • A community of like-minded learners on the journey.

The System Safety Engineering Academy is here! Normally $45 US per month (7 days free trial), but get one month free with code “one-month-free”.

A New Series of Lessons

I’m re-releasing my signature series of videos on System Safety with Mil-Std-882E. I’m bringing them up to date! If you want downloadable videos at great prices then these are the ones for you:

Links will be added as I release the lessons.

Always-free Content

System Safety Concepts and Principles.

PHIA Guide.

Risk Management 101.

My CISSP 2021 Exam Journey.

Discounted Courses on Udemy

Principles of Software Safety Standards – get your discount here.

  • Understand and apply generic SW safety standards;
  • List the 4+1 Principles and understand each one of them;
  • Apply the 4+1 Principles with examples, in isolation and together;
  • Evaluate specific SW standards using the 4+1 Principles; and
  • Understand the limitations of standards and compensate for them.

How to Design a System Safety Program – get your discount here.

  • Module 1 – Recap: Risk Basics. A Common Understanding of Risk;
  • Module 2 – System Safety Risk Analysis. How do we deal with real-world complexity?
  • Module 3 – Understanding Your Standard. Am I Doing the Right Thing, and am I Doing it Right?
  • Module 4 – Designing Your Program.  A Systematic, Effective Approach that isn’t Wasteful; and
  • Module 5 – More Resources. How to get more Resources and Help.

Meet the Author

My name’s Simon Di Nucci. I’m a practicing system safety engineer, and I have been, for the last 25 years; I’ve worked in all kinds of domains, aircraft, ships, submarines, sensors, and command and control systems, and some work on rail air traffic management systems, and lots of software safety. So, I’ve done a lot of different things!

Categories
Blog System Safety

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Quick Guide

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Quick Guide, takes you through some key points of this complex subject.

Introduction

System safety engineering plays a crucial role in ensuring the safety of complex systems. In this post, we will explore the fundamental concepts of system safety engineering and its importance in the realm of systems engineering.

System Safety Engineering Explained

System safety engineering, as the name implies, focuses on engineering safety within a systems-engineering context. It involves deliberately integrating safety measures into the framework of complex systems.

Read on, or watch this short video for some pointers:

What is System Safety Engineering?

Key Points of System Safety Engineering

1. Consider the Whole System

In system safety engineering, a holistic approach is essential. It’s not just about hardware and technical aspects; it includes software, operating environments, functions, user interactions, and data. This comprehensive view aligns with systems theory, ensuring a thorough safety assessment.

2. A Systematic Process

System safety engineering follows a systematic process. Starting with high-level requirements, it meticulously analyzes potential risks, safety obligations, and components. The V model illustrates this structured approach, emphasizing the importance of verification and validation at every stage.

The #Systems-Engineering 'V' Model
The Systems Engineering ‘V’ Model

3. Emphasis on Requirements

Unlike simple commodities like toasters, complex systems require rigorous requirement analysis. System engineers meticulously decompose the system, defining boundaries, interactions, and functionalities. These requirements undergo rigorous validation, minimizing surprises and ensuring safety from the start.

Bowtie diagram showing five types of hazard analysis.
Bowtie showing the Foundations of System Safety

4. Think Safety from the Start

A significant aspect of system safety engineering is the early integration of safety considerations. By addressing safety concerns right from the beginning, potential issues are identified and resolved cost-effectively. This proactive approach enhances the overall safety of the system.

Setting the direction towards safety from the start
Which way should we go?

Summary

In summary, system safety engineering is characterized by its systematic approach to understanding the entire system, following a structured process, and integrating concepts from systems engineering and systems theory. By focusing on comprehensive requirements and thinking about safety from the start, system safety engineering ensures the safety and reliability of complex systems.

Meet the Author

My name’s Simon Di Nucci. I’m a practicing system safety engineer, and I have been, for the last 25 years; I’ve worked in all kinds of domains, aircraft, ships, submarines, sensors, and command and control systems, and some work on rail air traffic management systems, and lots of software safety. So, I’ve done a lot of different things!

Meet the Author

If you found this helpful, there’s more depth in this article, and you can also see System Safety FAQ. There’s a low-price introductory course on the System Safety Process – on Udemy (please use this link, otherwise Udemy takes two-thirds of the revenue).

Categories
Blog System Safety

System Safety FAQ

Introduction

In System Safety FAQs I will deal with the most commonly searched-for online queries.  This post is also the basis for the First in a new series of monthly webinars I’m running.  I will also be answering your questions: leave them in the comments at the bottom of this post!

What is System Safety?

“System Safety is the application of engineering and management principles, criteria and techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risk within the constraints of operational effectiveness and suitability, time and cost throughout all phases of the system life cycle.”

NASA

This definition from NASA is spot on. System Safety is fundamentally about reducing the risks of mishaps (accidents). The NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance website is great for practitioners!

The #Systems-Engineering 'V' Model
The Systems Engineering ‘V’ Model

“The system safety concept calls for a risk management strategy based on identification, analysis of hazards and application of remedial controls using a systems-based approach”.[1] 

Wikipedia

This Wikipedia article reminds us that safety risk management is a subset of risk management in general.  It also brings in the concept of a ‘hazard’, which is typical for ‘system safety’ – see my free lesson on basic risk concepts for more information.

Where Does Safety Start?

Safety is an ‘emergent property’, that is it comes about by pulling together many different things.  Only leaders and managers can deliver these things; it doesn’t work if you try to do it from the bottom up.

“Safety undoubtedly starts at the top. The people leading the organization are the ones most responsible for its safety. It’s simple.”

Avatarms.com

I would also say that safety begins at the start of the lifecycle with requirements – see my short video about what System Safety is:

Safe System Approach?

“The Safe System approach adopts a holistic view of the road transport system and the interactions between people, vehicles, and the road environment. It recognises that people will always make mistakes and may have road crashes – but those crashes should not result in death or serious injury.”

Thinkroadsafety.sa.gov.au

This is a great view of a safe system approach, or strategy, from the world of road safety.  Road networks, their commercial and private users, neighbors, regulators, emergency services, etc., form a very complex distributed system.

Why System Safety?

What are the benefits?

“A customised Safety Management System will help you create an environment where all employees are empowered to identify hazards before they become problems, so your business can stay safe without losing focus on growth, profit or innovation.”

Worksafetyhub.com.au

I would add that a systematic approach to safety saves time and money in the long run.

System Safety for The 21st Century

Traditional System Safety has its critics, most famously professors Nancy Leveson and Erik Hollnagel.  They have made various criticisms of system safety – some of which I agree with, and some I most definitely do not.

Leveson has proposed new methods:

  • System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP);
  • Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA); and
  • Causal Analysis using System Theory (CAST) – accident analysis.

Hollnagel has written on a wide variety of safety topics including cognition, organizational robustness, and resilience.  He also coined the terms “Safety I” for traditional safety approaches, and “Safety II” to describe the conceptual approach that he and others have developed.

He designed the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM). 

“THE FRAM is a method to analyse how work activities take place either retrospectively or prospectively. This is done by analysing work activities in order to produce a model or representation of how work is done.”

Functionalresonance.com

I have tried FRAM, and even without any training (which is recommended), I found it tremendously powerful.  FRAM can analyse problems that conventional safety techniques just can’t get to grips with.   

From FRAM in a Nutshell by Mohammad Tishehzan at https://etn-peter.eu/2021/02/11/fram-in-a-nutshell/
From ‘FRAM in a Nutshell’ by Mohammad Tishehzan at etn-peter.eu

Others have also introduced the term “Safety III”, but I’m not sure how useful these labels are.  Perhaps we are now on a trajectory of diminishing returns.

System Safety is a Design Parameter

To save us from all this abstract navel-gazing, let’s get back to practical matters.

“Safety-related parameters are control system variables whose incorrect setting immediately increases the risk to the user.”

Machinery101.com

Concrete, specific, practical: I love it!  Let’s not forget that we do safety for a reason, and big part of that is to control the machines that make our modern world.  This doesn’t sound very exciting, but automation has enabled huge increases in productivity, wealth, health, quality of life, lifespan and human rights.  Let’s remember that during the current hysteria about Artificial Intelligence (actually Machine Learning).

Safety System of Work

“a safe system of work such as safety procedures. information, supervision, instruction and training on the safe use, handling and storage of machinery, structures, substances and other work tasks. personal protective equipment as required. a system to identify hazards, assess and control risks.”

Safework.sa.gov.au

If we think about it, this ties in nicely with the definition of a system used in system safety, e.g.:

“A combination, with defined boundaries, of elements that are used together in a defined operating environment to perform a given task or achieve a specific purpose. The elements may include personnel, procedures, materials, tools, equipment, facilities, services and/or software as appropriate.”

UK Defence Standard 00-56/1

System Safety in Engineering

There are a number of ways that we could answer this (implicit) question.  Here’s one from the Office of The Under Secretary Of Defense For Research And Engineering:

“System safety engineering involves planning, identifying, documenting, and mitigating hazards that contribute to mishaps involving defense systems, platforms, or personnel (military and the public). The system safety practice aids in optimizing the safety of a system.”

Ac.cto.mil

This definition neatly pulls together activities, hazards and accidents, those impacted and the aim of the whole thing.  Phew!

There’s More!

Webinar

I’m going to be talking about these topics in more depth in a webinar on EventBrite.  There are only 25 tickets, which are worth getting for all the extras!  If you don’t get in, then join my email list to get an invitation.

Questions and Comments?

Please leave them below.

Meet the Author

My name’s Simon Di Nucci. I’m a practicing system safety engineer, and I have been, for the last 25 years; I’ve worked in all kinds of domains, aircraft, ships, submarines, sensors, and command and control systems, and some work on rail air traffic management systems, and lots of software safety. So, I’ve done a lot of different things!

Meet the Author

[1] Harold E. Roland; Brian Moriarty (1990). System Safety Engineering and Management. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0471618160.

Categories
Human Factors System Safety

Introduction to Human Factors

In this 40-minute video, ‘Introduction to Human Factors’, I am very pleased to welcome Peter Benda to The Safety Artisan.

Peter is a colleague and Human Factors specialist, who has 23 years’ experience in applying Human Factors to large projects in all kinds of domains. In this session we look at some fundamentals: what does Human Factors engineering aim to achieve? Why do it? And what sort of tools and techniques are useful?

This is The Safety Artisan, so we also discuss some real-world examples of how erroneous human actions can contribute to accidents. (See this post for a fuller example of that.) And, of course, how Human Factors discipline can help to prevent them.

In ‘Introduction to Human Factors’, Peter explains these vital terms to us!

Topics

  • Introducing Peter;
  • The Joint Optimization Of Human-Machine Systems;
  • So why do it (HF)?
  • Introduction to Human Factors;
  • Definitions of Human Factors;
  • The Long Arm of Human Factors;
  • What is Human Factors Integration? and
  • More HF sessions to come…

Introduction to Human Factors: Transcript

Introduction

Simon:  Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Safety Artisan: Home of Safety Engineering Training. I’m Simon and I’m your host, as always. But today we are going to be joined by a guest, a Human Factors specialist, a colleague, and a friend of mine called Peter Benda. Now, Peter started as one of us, an ordinary engineer, but unusually, perhaps for an engineer, he decided he didn’t like engineering without people in it. He liked the social aspects and the human aspects and so he began to specialize in that area. And today, after twenty-three years in the business, and first degree and a master’s degree in engineering with a Human Factors speciality. He’s going to join us and share his expertise with us.

So that’s how you got into it then, Peter. For those of us who aren’t really familiar with Human Factors, how would you describe it to a beginner?

Peter:   Well, I would say it’s The Joint Optimization Of Human-Machine Systems. So it’s really focusing on designing systems, perhaps help holistically would be a term that could be used, where we’re looking at optimizing the human element as well as the machine element. And the interaction between the two. So that’s really the key to Human Factors. And, of course, there are many dimensions from there; environmental, organizational, job factors, human and individual characteristics. All of these influence behaviour at work and health and safety. Another way to think about it is the application of scientific information concerning humans to the design of systems. Systems are for human use, which I think most systems are.

Simon:  Indeed. Otherwise, why would humans build them?

Peter:   That’s right. Generally speaking, sure.

Simon:  So, given that this is a thing that people do then. Perhaps we’re not so good at including the human unless we think about it specifically?

Peter:   I think that’s fairly accurate. I would say that if you look across industries, and industries are perhaps better at integrating Human Factors, considerations or Human Factors into the design lifecycle, that they have had to do so because of the accidents that have occurred in the past. You could probably say this about safety engineering as well, right?

Simon:  And this is true, yes.

Peter:   In a sense, you do it because you have to because the implications of not doing it are quite significant. However, I would say the upshot, if you look at some of the evidence –and you see this also across software design and non-safety critical industries or systems –that taking into account human considerations early in the design process typically ends up in better system performance. You might have more usable systems, for example. Apple would be an example of a company that puts a lot of focus into human-computer interaction and optimizing the interface between humans and their technologies and ensuring that you can walk up and use it fairly easily. Now as time goes on, one can argue how out how well Apple is doing something like that, but they were certainly very well known for taking that approach.

Simon:  And reaped the benefits accordingly and became, I think, they were the world’s number one company for a while.

Peter:   That’s right. That’s right.

Simon:  So, thinking about the, “So why do it?” What is one of the benefits of doing Human Factors well?

Peter:   Multiple benefits, I would say. Clearly, safety and safety-critical systems, like health and safety; Performance, so system performance; Efficiency and so forth. Job satisfaction and that has repercussions that go back into, broadly speaking, that society. If you have meaningful work that has other repercussions and that’s sort of the angle I originally came into all of this from. But, you know, you could be looking at just the safety and efficiency aspects.

Simon:  You mentioned meaningful work: is that what attracted you to it?

Peter:   Absolutely. Absolutely. Yes. Yes, like I said I had a keen interest in the sociology of work and looking at work organization. Then, for my master’s degree, I looked at lean production, which is the Toyota approach to producing vehicles. I looked at multiskilled teams and multiskilling and job satisfaction. Then looking at stress indicators and so forth versus mass production systems. So that’s really the angle I came into this. If you look at it, mass production lines where a person is doing the same job over and over, it’s quite repetitive and very narrow, versus the more Japanese style lean production. There are certainly repercussions, both socially and individually, from a psychological health perspective.

Simon:  So, you get happy workers and more contented workers –

Peter:   – And better quality, yeah.

Simon:  And again, you mentioned Toyota. Another giant company that’s presumably grown partly through applying these principles.

Peter:   Well, they’re famous for quality, aren’t they? Famous for reliable, high-quality cars that go on forever. I mean, when I moved from Canada to Australia, Toyota has a very, very strong history here with the Land Cruiser, and the high locks, and so forth.

Simon:  All very well-known brands here. Household names.

Peter:   Are known to be bombproof and can outlast any other vehicle. And the lean production system certainly has, I would say, quite a bit of responsibility for the production of these high-quality cars.

Simon:  So, we’ve spoken about how you got into it and “What is it?” and “Why do it?” I suppose, as we’ve said, what it is in very general terms but I suspect a lot of people listening will want to know to define what it is, what Human Factors is, based on doing it. On how you do it. It’s a long, long time since I did my Human Factors training. Just one module in my masters, so could you take me through what Human Factors involves these days in broad terms.

Peter:   Sure, I actually have a few slides that might be useful –  

Simon:  – Oh terrific! –

Peter:   – maybe I should present that. So, let me see how well I can share this. And of course, sometimes the problem is I’ll make sure that – maybe screen two is the best way to share it. Can you see that OK?

Simon:  Yeah, that’s great…

(See the video for the full content)

Introduction to Human Factors: Leave a Comment!

Categories
Blog System Safety

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Holistic Approach to Ensuring Safety

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Holistic Approach to Ensuring Safety. To know that we first need to understand what Systems Engineering is…

Section 1: The Basics of Systems Engineering

It starts with needs and concepts, which may be quite abstract, and progressively breaks these down into concrete, specific requirements. We also determine how those requirements will be verified.

Section 2: The Transformative Process

We then transform those requirements into a logical architecture and then into a design. Then the design is translated into physical and functional components that can be developed or bought. Through all these transformations, the requirements are decomposed and flow down. Thus, we see how each component, or Configurable Item, contributes to meeting the requirements for the overall System.

Section 3: The Practice of System Safety Engineering

Finally, we must put the components together – integrate them – perhaps testing as we go to make sure that they work together. We can then verify the completed system, and support customer validation.

That’s the theory (albeit very briefly, I went on a week-long course just to learn the basics). In my experience, the practice of System Safety Engineering involves five things, it:

  1. Deals with the whole system, including software, data, people, and environment;
  2. Uses a systematic (rigorous) process;
  3. Concentrates on requirements (to cope with complexity);
  4. Considers safety early in the system life cycle; and
  5. Handles complexity cost-effectively and efficiently.

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Holistic Approach to Ensuring Safety

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Holistic Approach to Ensuring Safety – watch the Lesson Here.

System Safety Engineering: Transcript

What is system safety or system safety engineering? Well, as the name suggests, system safety is engineering safety in a systems-engineering context. Okay. So it’s safety that’s deliberately sat within a systems-engineering framework.

That drives everything about how we consider safety.  Like systems engineering in general, it follows systems theory. But I’m not going to talk about systems theory now. That’s a huge subject.

I’m not actually an expert in [the theory], but I’m going to talk about three practical things that I’ve observed from doing system safety for 25 years or so.

Section 5: Considering the Whole System

First of all, we consider the system holistically. So it’s not just the technical stuff. It’s not just the hardware. It’s the software as well if there’s any software in the system.

It’s the operating environment around the system and what we’re doing with it, the functions that we’re asking it to do, all the applications that we’re putting it to, and we include the people who are using it. We include all the data that’s being used, all of the documentation, everything. So we are looking at the system as a whole in accordance with systems theory. That’s the first point.

Section 6: A Systematic Process

The second point is that it is systematic from a process point of view.

We’re following a rigorous process whereby maybe we start with some sort of high-level requirements, and we think about in safety terms what could go wrong. And we think about all of our safety obligations, what we must do. And then we decompose that, break down the problem piece by piece, systematically down to a component level. And then we consider all of the components, and then we systematically integrate it all back together.

And what I’m kind of indicating is the V model, where we start at the top left-hand corner with our requirements. And then from our requirements, we think about, well, how are we going to demonstrate that we’ve met those requirements at the end of the process? And then we carry on going down the decomposing into more detail but also thinking about how we’re going to verify and validate that we’ve done what we needed to do at every stage when we integrate and come back up the other side.

So that’s the systematic part of the process.

Section 7: Requirements and Safety

And then Thirdly, which are kind of hinted up already, is a big thing about requirements.

In systems engineering, we are talking about complex stuff. It’s hard to understand. It’s not a toaster. It’s not a simple commodity item, where we can just go, well, I want a toaster and everybody knows what a toaster does or should do and what it shouldn’t do. We want to want it to toast bread and other things, but we don’t want it to electrocute people.

You know what a toaster is. You don’t need to articulate the requirements of a toaster. But if it’s something more complicated, like a ship or a power station or a complex piece of information technology, you want to develop a big software system to do something, then that’s very complicated, and you need to consider the requirements in a systematic fashion, starting at the top level, thinking about big picture stuff, what’s the system and its boundaries, what does it interact with?  What do we want it to do?

Then we need to go to a lot of effort to rigorously decompose that and come up with requirements, which you then verify and validate at the end of the project – or preferably before to avoid surprises. That’s a big part of systems engineering, as we’re dealing with complexity, and systems safety evolved to fit in with systems engineering.  It uses all of those concepts, all of those are powerful levers to help us engineer safety into a system rather than just adding it on at the very end.

Section 8: Think Safety from the Start

I guess that’s the fourth big point. We start to think about safety right at the beginning, at the top left-hand corner of the V, not just at the end, and then add it on and hope everything will be all right, because that doesn’t usually work. And that’s a very, usually a very expensive and ineffective way to do things.

So that’s another point that system safety engineering. We are engineering safety into the system early because that is a more cost-effective way of doing it.

Summary

To summarise system safety engineering, remember:

  • It’s systematic in terms of the way we think about the system and all of its parts;
  • It’s systematic in terms of the process, the way we approach the task and break down the tasks rigorously and put them back together; and
  • It borrows from systems engineering and systems theory in the way we consider requirements.

Those three things are system safety engineering. For more on system safety try the FAQ post and the system safety assessment page.

Understanding System Safety Engineering: A Holistic Approach to Ensuring Safety

Did I Miss Anything? Leave a Comment!

Categories
Mil-Std-882E Safety Analysis System Safety

Sub-System Hazard Analysis

In this video lesson, I look at Sub-System Hazard Analysis, or SSHA, which is Task 204 in Mil-Std-882E. SSHA is designed to be used where a formal Sub-System Specification (SSS) has been created. However, an SSS is not essential to perform this Task. The need for SSHA is usually driven by the complexity of the system and/or that sub-system development is contracted out.

Together, we will explore Task 204’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements. There’s value-adding commentary, and I explain the issues with SSHA – how to do it well and avoid the pitfalls.

This is the seven-minute demo, the full video is 40-minutes’ long.

Topics: Sub-System Hazard Analysis

  • Preamble: Sub-system & System HA.
  • Task 204 Purpose:
    • Verify subsystem compliance;
    • Identify (new) hazards; and
    • Recommend necessary actions.
  • Task Description (six slides);
  • Reporting;
  • Contracting; and
  • Commentary.
Transcript: Sub-System Hazard Analysis

Introduction

Hello, everyone, and welcome to the Safety Artisan, where you will find professional, pragmatic, and impartial instruction on all things system safety. I’m Simon – I’m your host for today, as always and it’s the fourth of April 22. With everything that’s going on in the world, I hope that this video finds you safe and well.

Sub-System Hazard Analysis

Let’s move straight on to what we’re going to be doing. We’re going to be talking today about subsystem hazard analysis and this is task 204 under the military standard 882E. Previously we’ve done 201, which was preliminary hazard identification, 202, which is preliminary hazard analysis, and 203, which is safety requirements hazard analysis. And with task 204 and task 205, which is system has analysis, we’re now moving into getting stuck into particular systems that we’re thinking about, whether they be physical systems or intangible. We’re thinking about the system under consideration and I’m really getting into that analysis.

Topics for this Session

So, the topics that we’re going to cover today, I’ve got a little preamble to set things in perspective. We then get into the three purposes of task 204. First, to verify compliance. Secondly, to identify new hazards. And thirdly, to recommend necessary actions. Or in fact, that would be recommended control measures for hazards and risks.

We’ve got six slides on the task description, a couple of slides on reporting, one on contracting, and then a few slides on some commentary where I put in my tuppence worth and I’ll hopefully add some value to the basic bones of the standard. It’s worth saying that you’ll notice that subsystem is highlighted in yellow and the reason for that is that the subsystem and system hazard analysis tasks are very, very similar. They’re identical except for certain passages and I’ve highlighted those in yellow. Normally I use a yellow highlighter to emphasize something I want to talk about.

This time around, I’m using underlining for that and the yellow is showing you what these different for subsystem analysis as opposed to system. And when you’ve watched both sessions on 204 and 205, I think you’ll see the significance of why I’ve done.

Preamble – Sub-system & System HA

Before we get started, we need to explain the system model that the 882 is assuming. If we look on the left-hand side of the hexagons, we’ve got our system in the centre, which we’re considering. Maybe that interfaces with other systems. They work within operating environment; hence we have the icon of the world, and the system and maybe other systems are there for a purpose. They’re performing some task; they’re doing some function and that’s indicated by the tools. We’re using the system to do something, whatever it might be.

Then as we move to the right-hand side, the system is itself broken down into subsystems. We’ve got a couple here. We’ve got sub-system A and B and then A further broken down into A1 and A2, for example. There’s some sort of hierarchy of subsystems that are coming together and being integrated to form the overall system. That is the overall picture that I’d like to bear in mind while we’re talking about this. The assumption in the 882, is we’re going to be looking at this subsystem hierarchy bottom upwards, largely. We’ll come on to that.

System Requirements Hazard Analysis (T204)

Purpose of the task, as I’ve said before, it’s threefold. We must verify subsystem compliance with requirements. Requirements to deal with risk and hazards. We must identify previously unidentified hazards which may emerge as we’re working at a lower level now. And we must recommend actions necessary. That’s further requirements to eliminate all hazards or mitigate associated risks. We’ll keep those three things in mind and that will keep coming up.

Task Description (T204) #1

The first of six slides on the task description. Basically, we are being told to perform and document the SSHA, sub-system hazard analysis. And it’s got to include everything, whether it be new developments, COTS, GOTS, GFE, NDI, software and humans, as we’ll see later. Everything must be included. And we’re being guided to consider the performance of the subsystem: ‘What it is doing when it is doing it properly’. We’ve got to consider performance degradation, functional failures, timing errors, design errors or defects, and inadvertent functioning – we’ll come back to that later. And while we’re doing analysis, we must consider the human as a component within the subsystem dealing with inputs and making outputs. If, of course, there is an associated human. We’ve got to include everything, and we’ve got to think about what could go wrong with the system.

Task Description (T204) #2

The minimum that the analysis has got to cover is as follows. We’ve got to verify subsystem compliance with requirements and that is to say, requirements to eliminate hazards or reduce risks. The first thing to note about that is you can’t verify compliance with requirements if there are no requirements. if you haven’t set any requirements on the subsystem provider or whoever is doing the analysis, then there’s nothing to comply with and you’ve got no leverage if the subsystem turns out to be dangerous. I often see it as it gets missed.

People don’t do their top-down systems engineering properly; They don’t think through the requirements that they need; and, especially, they don’t do the preliminary hazard identification and analysis that they need to do. They don’t do Task 203, the SRHA, to think about what requirements they need to place further down the food chain, down the supply chain. And if you haven’t done that work, then you can’t be surprised if you get something back that’s not very good, or you can’t verify that it’s safe. Unfortunately, I see that happen often, even on exceptionally large projects. If you don’t ask, you don’t get, basically.

We’ve got two sub-paragraphs here that are unique to this task. First, we’ve got to validate flow down of design requirements. “Are these design requirements valid?”, “Are they the right requirements?” From the top-level spec down to more detailed design specifications for the subsystem. Again, if you haven’t specified anything, then you’ve got no leverage. Which is not to say that you have to dive into massive detail and tell the designer how to do their job, but you’ve got to set out what you want from them in terms of the product and what kind of process evidence you want associated with that product.

And then the second sub-paragraph, you’ve got to ensure design criteria in the subsystem specs have been satisfied. We need to verify that they’re satisfied, and that V and V of subsystem mitigation measures or risk controls have been included in test plans and procedures. As always, the Mil. standard 882 is the American standard, and they tend to go big on testing. Where it says test plans and procedures that might be anything – you might have been doing V and V by analysis, by demonstration, by testing, by other means. It’s not necessarily just testing, but that’s often the assumption.

End

So, that’s the end of the presentation and it just remains for me to say, thanks very much for watching and supporting the Safety Artisan. And I’ll be doing Task 205 system hazard analysis next in the series, look forward to seeing you again soon. Bye-bye, everyone.

End: Sub-System Hazard Analysis

You can find a free pdf of the System Safety Engineering Standard, Mil-Std-882E, here.

Categories
Safety Analysis System Safety

Foundations of Safety Assessment

In this post on the Foundations of Safety Assessment, I’m going to look at the (few) things that we need to do in every System Safety Program.

Because we don’t always need to do everything. We don’t always need to throw everything at the problem. Some systems are simpler than others, and they don’t need the ‘whole nine yards’ in order to get a decent result. With that knowledge, we’re going to be able to design an analysis program for different applications or for different systems.

As an example, I’m going to use Military Standard 882E (Mil-Std-882E). Under that standard we would use these Tasks:

  • Task 201 – Preliminary Hazard Identification;
  • Task 202 – Preliminary Hazard Analysis; and
  • Task 203 – System Requirements Hazard Analysis.

(You will also find related material in my posts on Safety Analysis Techniques Overview and tailoring your Risk Analysis Program.)

Foundations of Safety Assessment – The Big Picture

I promised you we were going to look at the overview of the sequence.

And I think this is what pulls it all together and explains it powerfully. So the background to this is we’ve got, an accident or mishap sequence. Whatever you want to call it and we start with causes on the left and causes lead two a hazard, and then a has it can lead to multiple consequences.

Bowtie diagram showing five types of hazard analysis.
Bowtie showing the Foundations of System Safety

That is what the bowtie here is representing. It’s showing that multiple causes can lead to a single hazard, and a single hazard can lead to multiple consequences.

Don’t worry too much about the bow tie. I’m not pushing that in particular, it’s a useful technique, but it’s not the only one. We’ll come onto that – that’s the background.

This is the accident sequence we’re trying to discover and understand. I’m going to talk a lot about discovery and understanding.

Preliminary Hazard Identification

Typically, we will start by trying to identify hazards. There are techniques out there that will help us identify hazards associated with the system being used in a specific application, or purpose, in a specific operating environment.

Always bear in mind those three questions about the context, that help us to do this. What’s the system? What are we using it for? and in what environment?

And if we change any of those things, then probably the hazards will change. But we start off with preliminary hazard identification, which is intended to identify hazards. There’s a big, big arrow pointing at hazards, but also, inevitably, it will identify causes and consequences as well, because it’s not always clear. What is the hazard when you start? talking of discovery, we’re going to discover some stuff.

We may finally classify what we’re talking about later. we’re trying to discover hazards. In reality, we’re going to discover lots of stuff, but mainly we hope hazards, that’s stage one.

System Requirements Hazard Analysis

Now, then we’re actually going to step outside of the accident sequence itself. We’re going to do some requirements analysis, and the requirements analysis has to come after the PHIA because some safety requirements are driven by the presence of certain hazards.

If you’ve got a noise hazard somebody’s hearing might be affected, then regulations in multiple countries are going to require you to do certain things to monitor the noise. Let’s say or monitor the effect that it’s having on workers and put in place a program to handle that. The presence of certain hazards will drive certain requirements for safety controls or risk controls.

Then there are the broader requirements. Analysis of what the law requires, what the regulations require, codes of practice, etc. We’ll get onto that, and one of the things that requirements analysis is going to do is give us an initial stab of what we’ve got to have – certain controls because we’re required to. That’s a little bit of an aside in terms of the sequence, but it’s very, very important.

Preliminary Hazard Analysis

Thirdly, and, fourthly, once we’ve discovered some hazards, we’re going to need to understand what might cause those hazards and therefore how likely is the hazard to exist in particular circumstances, and then also think about the consequences that might arise from a hazard. And once we’ve explored those, we will be in a position to actually capture the risk.

 Because we will have some view on likelihood. And we would also have some view on the severity of consequences from considering the consequences. We’ll come onto that later.

Looking at Controls

Finally, having done all those other things, we will be in a position to take a much more systematic look at controls and say, we’ve got these causes. We’ve got these hazards. We’ve got these potential consequences.  What do I need to do to control this risk and prevent this accident sequence from playing out?

What I need to put in place to interrupt the accident sequence, and I’ve put the controls. The dashed lines indicate that we’ve got barriers to that accident sequence, and they are dashed because no control is perfect. (Other than gravity. But of course, if you turn your vehicle upside down, then gravity is working against you, so even gravity isn’t foolproof.)

No control is 100% effective. We need to just accept that and deal with that, and understand. There is your overview of the sequence, and I’ve spent a bit of time talking about that because it is absolutely fundamental to everything you’re going to do.

Well, That’s a Brief Summary of the Foundations of Safety Assessment

You can see the whole thing in the course bundle here.

If you have any questions then leave a comment, below.

Categories
Mil-Std-882E Safety Analysis System Safety

System Requirements Hazard Analysis

In this 45-minute session, I’m looking at System Requirements Hazard Analysis, or SRHA, which is Task 203 in the Mil-Std-882E standard. I will explore Task 203’s aim, description, scope, and contracting requirements.  SRHA is an important and complex task, which needs to be done on several levels to be successful.  This video explains the issues and discusses how to perform SRHA well.

This is the seven-minute demo video, the full version is 40 minutes’ long.

Topics: System Requirements Hazard Analysis

  • Task 202 Purpose;
  • Task Description:
    • Determine Requirements;
    • Incorporate Requirements; and
    • Assess the compliance of the System.
  • Contracting;
  • Section 4.2 (of the standard); and
  • Commentary.
Transcript: System Requirements Hazard Analysis

Introduction

Hello and welcome to the Safety Artisan, where you will find professional, pragmatic and impartial advice on all things system, safety and related.

System Requirements Hazard Analysis

And so today, which is the 1st of March 2020, we’re going to be talking about – let me just find it for you – we’ll be talking about system requirements, hazard analysis. And this is part of our series on Mil. Standard 882E (882 Echo) and this one a task 203. Task 203 in the Mil. standard. And it’s a very widely used system safety engineering standard and its influence is found in many places, not just on military procurement programs.

Topics for this Session

We’re going to look at this task, which is very important, possibly the most important task of all, as we’ll see. so in to talk about the purpose of the task, which is word for word from the task description itself. We’re going to talk about in the task description, the three aims of this task, which is to determine or work out requirements, incorporate them, and then assess the compliance of the system with those requirements, because, of course, it may not be a simple read-across. We’ve got six slides on that. That’s most of the task. Then we’ve just got one slide on contracting, which if you’ve seen any of the others in this series, will seem very familiar. We’ve got a little bit of a chat about Section 4.2 from the standard and some commentary, and the reason for that will become clear. So, let’s crack on.

System Requirements Hazard Analysis

Task 203.1, the purpose of Task 203 is to perform and document a System Requirements Hazard Analysis or SRHA. And as we’ve already said, the purpose of this is to determine the design requirements. We’re going to focus on design rather than buying stuff off the shelf – we’ll talk about the implications of that a little bit later. Design requirements to eliminate or reduce hazards and risks, incorporate those requirements, into a says, into the documentation, but what it should say is incorporate risk reduction measures into the system itself and then document it. And then finally, to assess compliance of the system with these requirements. Then it says the SRHA address addresses all life-cycle phases, so not just meant for you to think about certain phases of the program. What are the requirements through life for the system? And in all modes. Whether it’s in operation, whether it’s in maintenance or refit, whether it’s being repaired or disposed of, whatever it might be.

Task Description #1

First of six slides on the task description. I’m using more than one colour because there’s some quite a lot of important points packed quite tightly together in this description. We’re assuming that the contractor performs and documents this SRHA. The customer needs to do a lot of work here before ever gets near a contractor. More on that later. We need to determine system design requirements to eliminate hazards or reduce associated risks.

Two things here. By identifying applicable policies, regulations and standards etc. More on that later. And analysing identified hazards. So, requirements to perform the analysis as well as to simply just state ‘We want a system to do this and not to do that’. So, we need to put some requirements to say ‘Here’s what we want analysed maybe to what degree? And why.’ is always helpful.

Task Description #2

Breaking those breaking those two requirements down.

Part a. We’re going to identify applicable requirements by reviewing our military and industry standards and specs, historical documentation of systems that are similar or with a system that we’re replacing, perhaps. Look at, it’s assumed that the US Department of Defense is the customer, ultimate customer. So, the ultimate customer’s requirements, including whatever they’ve said about standard ways of mitigating certain common risks. System performance spec, that’s your functional performance spec or whatever you want to call it. Other system design requirements and documents- Bit of a catchall there. And applicable federal, military, state and local regulations. This is a US standard. It’s a federated system, much like Australia or indeed lots of modern states, even the UK. There are variations in law across England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland. They’re not great, but they do exist. And in the US and Australia, those differences are greater. And it says applicable executive orders. Executive orders, they’re not law, but they are what the executive arm of the U.S. government has issued, and international agreements. A lot of words in there- have a look at the different statements that are in that in white, blue and yellow. Basically, from international agreements right down to whatever requirements may be applicable, they all need to be looked at and taken account of. So, there’s a huge amount of work there for someone to do. I’ll come back to who that someone should be later.

End

Well, that is the end of the presentation. And it just remains for me to say thanks again for watching and do lookout for the next sessions in the series on 882 echo (882E). There are quite a few to go. We’re going to go through all the tasks and the general and specific requirements of the standard and the appendices. We will also talk about more advanced topics, about how we manage and apply all this stuff.

So, from The Safety Artisan, thanks very much and goodbye.

End: System Requirements Hazard Analysis

You can find a free pdf of the System Safety Engineering Standard, Mil-Std-882E, here.

Categories
Blog System Safety

System Safety Principles

In this 45-minute video, I discuss System Safety Principles, as set out by the US Federal Aviation Authority in their System Safety Handbook. Although this was published in 2000, the principles still hold good (mostly) and are worth discussing. I comment on those topics where the modern practice has moved on, and those jurisdictions where the US approach does not sit well.

This is the ten-minute preview of the full, 45-minute video.

System Safety Principles: Topics

  • Foundational statement
  • Planning
  • Management Authority
  • Safety Precedence
  • Safety Requirements
  • System Analyses Assumptions & Criteria
  • Emphasis & Results
  • MA Responsibilities
  • Software hazard analysis
  • An Effective System Safety Program

System Safety Principles: Transcript

Hello and welcome to The Safety Artisan where you will find professional pragmatic and impartial educational products. I’m Simon and it’s the 3rd of November 2019. Tonight I’m going to be looking at a short introduction to System Safety Principles.

Introduction

On to system safety principles; in the full video we look at all principles from the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority’s System Safety Handbook but in this little four- or five-minute video – whatever it turns out to be – we’ll take a quick look just to let you know what it’s about.

Topics for this Session

These are the subjects in the full session. Really a fundamental statement; we talk about planning; talk about the management authority (which is the body that is responsible for bringing into existence -in this case- some kind of aircraft or air traffic control system, something like that, something that the FAA would be the regulator for in the US).

We talk about safety precedents. In other words, what’s the most effective safety control to use. Safety requirements; system analyses – which are highlighted because that’s just the sample I’m going to talk about, tonight; assumptions and safety criteria; emphasis and results – which is really about how much work you put in where and why; management authority responsibilities; a little aside of a specialist area – software hazard analysis; And finally, what you need for an effective System Safety Program.

Now, it’s worth mentioning that this is not an uncritical look at the FAA handbook. It is 19 years old now so the principles are still good, but some of it’s a bit long in the tooth. And there are some areas where, particularly on software, things have moved on. And there are some areas where the FAA approach to system safety is very much predicated on an American approach to how these things are done.  

Systems Analysis

So, without further ado, let’s talk about system analysis. There are two points that the Handbook makes. First of all, these analyses are basic tools for systematically developing design specifications. Let’s unpack that statement. So, the analyses are tools- they’re just tools. You’ve still got to manage safety. You’ve still got to estimate risk and make decisions- that’s absolutely key. The system analyses are tools to help you do that. They won’t make decisions for you. They won’t exercise authority for you or manage things for you. They’re just tools.

Secondly, the whole point is to apply them systematically. So, coverage is important here- making sure that we’ve covered the entire system. And also doing things in a thorough and orderly fashion. That’s the systematic bit about it.

And then finally, it’s about developing design specifications. Now, this is where the American emphasis comes in. But before we talk about that, it’s fundamental to note that really we need to work out what our safety requirements are.

What are we Trying to Achieve?

What are we trying to achieve here with safety? And why? These are really important concepts because if you don’t know what you’re trying to achieve then it will be very difficult to get there and to demonstrate that you’ve got there – which is kind of the point of safety. Putting effort into getting the requirements right is very important because without doing that first step all your other work could be invalid. In my experience of 20-plus years in the business, if you don’t have a precise grasp of what you’re trying to achieve then you’re going to waste a lot of time and money, probably.

So, onto the second bullet point. Now the handbook says that the ultimate measure of safety is not the scope of analysis but in satisfying requirements. So, the first part – very good. We’re not doing analysis for the sake of it. That’s not the measure of safety – that we’ve analyzed something to death or that we’ve expended vast amounts of dollars on doing this work but that we’ve worked out the requirements and the analysis has helped us to meet them. That is the key point.

Safety in Different Jurisdictions

This is where it can go slightly pear-shaped in that this emphasis on requirements (almost to the exclusion of anything else) is a very U.S.-centric way of doing things. So, very much in the US, the emphasis is you meet the spec, you certify that you’ve met spec and therefore we’re safe. But of course what if the spec is wrong? Or what if it’s just plain inappropriate for a new use of an existing system or whatever it might be?

In other jurisdictions, notably the U.K. (and as you can tell from my accent that’s where I’m from, I’ve got a lot of experience doing safety work in the U.K. but also Australia where I now live and work) it’s not about meeting requirements. Well, it is but let me explain. In the UK and Australia, English law works on the idea of intent.

So, we aim to make something safe: not whether it has that it’s necessarily met requirements or not, that doesn’t really matter so much, but is the risk actually reduced to an acceptable level? There are tests for deciding what is acceptable. Have you complied with the law? The law outside the US can take a very different approach to “it’s all about the specification”.

Not Just the Specification

Of course, those legal requirements and that requirement to reduce risk to an acceptable level, are, in themselves, requirements. But in Australian or British legal jurisdiction, you need to think about those legal requirements as well. They must be part of your requirements set.

So, just having a specification for a technical piece of cake that ignores the requirements of the law, which include not only design requirements but the thing is actually safe in service and can be safely introduced, used, disposed of, etc. If you don’t take those things into account you may not meet all your obligations under that system of law.

So, there’s an important point to understanding and using American standards and an American approach to system safety out of the assumed context. And that’s true of all standards and all approaches but it’s a point I bring out in the main video quite forcefully because it’s very important to understand.

Back to the Start Here Page. Get the full-length lesson for free HERE.

Categories
Blog System Safety

Safety Concepts Part 2

In this 33-minute session, Safety Concepts Part 2, The Safety Artisan equips you with more Safety Concepts. We look at the basic concepts of safety, risk, and hazard in order to understand how to assess and manage them. Exploring these fundamental topics provides the foundations for all other safety topics, but it doesn’t have to be complex. The basics are simple, but they need to be thoroughly understood and practiced consistently to achieve success. This video explains the issues and discusses how to achieve that success.

Highlights of Safety Concepts, Part 2 video.

Safety Concepts Part 2: Topics

  • Risk & Harm;
  • Accident & Accident Sequence;
  • (Cause), Hazard, Consequence & Mitigation;
  • Requirements / Essence of System Safety;
  • Hazard Identification & Analysis;
  • Risk Reduction / Estimation;
  • Risk Evaluation & Acceptance;
  • Risk Management & Safety Management; and
  • Safety Case & Report.

Safety Concepts Part 2: Transcript

Click Here for the Transcript

Hi everyone, and welcome to the safety artisan where you will find professional, pragmatic, and impartial advice on safety. I’m Simon, and welcome to the show today, which is recorded on the 23rd of September 2019. Today we’re going to talk about system safety concepts. A couple of days ago I recorded a short presentation (Part 1) on this, which is also on YouTube.  Today we are going to talk about the same concepts but in much more depth.

In the short session, we took some time picking apart the definition of ‘safe’. I’m not going to duplicate that here, so please feel free to go have a look. We said that to demonstrate that something was safe, we had to show that risk had been reduced to a level that is acceptable in whatever jurisdiction we’re working in.

And in this definition, there are a couple of tests that are appropriate that the U.K., but perhaps not elsewhere. We also must meet safety requirements. And we must define the Scope and bound the system that we’re talking about a Physical system or an intangible system like a computer program. We must define what we’re doing with it and what it’s being used for. And within which operating environment within which context is being used.  And if we could do all those things, then we can objectively say – or claim – that the system is safe.

Topics

We’re going to talk about a lot more Topics. We’re going to talk about risk accidents. The cause has a consequence sequence. They talk about requirements and. Spoiler alert. What I consider to be the essence of system safety. And then we’ll get into talking about the process. Of demonstrating safety, hazard identification, and analysis.

Risk Reduction and estimation. Risk Evaluation. And acceptance. And then pulling it all together. Risk management safety management. And finally, reporting, making an argument that the system is safe supporting with evidence. And summarizing all of that in a written report. This is what we do, albeit in different ways and calling it different things.

Risk

Onto the first topic. Risk and harm.  Our concept of risk. It’s a combination of the likelihood and severity of harm. Generally, we’re talking about harm. To people. Death. Injury. Damage to help. Now we might also choose to consider any damage to property in the environment. That’s all good. But I’m going to concentrate on harm to people. Because usually, that’s what we’re required to do. By the law. And there are other laws covering the environment and property sometimes. That. We’re not going to talk.  just to illustrate this point. This risk is a combination of Severity and likelihood.

We’ve got a very crude. Risk table here. With a likelihood along the top. And severity. Downside. And we might. See that by looking at the table if we have a high likelihood and high severity. Well, that’s a high risk. Whereas if we have Low Likelihood and low severity. We might say that’s a low risk. And then. In between, a combination of high and low we might say that’s medium. Now, this is a very crude and simple example. Deliberately.

You will see risk matrices like this. In. Loads of different standards. And you may be required to define your own for a specific system, there are lots of variations on this but they’re all basically. Doing this thing and we’re illustrating. How do we determine the level of risk. By that combination of severity. And likely, I think a picture is worth a thousand words. Moving online to the accident. We’re talking about (in this standard) an unintended event that causes harm.

Accidents, Sequences and Consequences

Not all jurisdictions just consider accidental events, some consider deliberate harm as well. We’ll leave that out. A good example of that is work health and safety in Australia but no doubt we’ll get to that in another video sometime. And the accident sequences the progression of events. That results in an accident that leads to an. Now we’re going to illustrate the accident sequence in a moment but before we get there. We need to think about cousins.  here we’ve got a hazardous physical situation or state of a system. Often following some initiating event that may lead to an accident, a thing that may cause harm.

And then allied with that we have the idea of consequences. Of outcomes or an outcome. Resulting from. An. Event. Now that all sounds a bit woolly doesn’t it, let’s illustrate that. Hopefully, this will make it a lot clearer. Now. I’ve got a sequence here. We have. Causes. That might lead to a hazard. And the hazard might lead to different consequences. And that’s the accident. See. Now in this standard, they didn’t explicitly define causes.

Cause, Hazard, and Consequence

They’re just called events. But most mostly we will deal with causes and consequences in system safety. And it’s probably just easier to implement it. Whether or not you choose to explicitly address every cause. That’s often an optional step. But this is the accident Sequence that we’re looking at. These sorts of funnels are meant to illustrate the fact that they may be many causes for one hazard. And one has it may lead to many consequences on some of those consequences. Maybe. No harm at all.

We may not actually have an accident. We may get away with it. We may have a. Hazard. And. Know no harm may befall a human. And if we take all of this together that’s the accident sequence. Now it’s worth reiterating that just because a hazard exists, it does not necessarily lead to harm. But to get to harm, we must have a hazard; a hazard is both necessary and sufficient. To lead to harmful consequences. OK.

Hazards: an Example

And you can think of a hazard as an accident waiting to happen. You can think of it in lots of different ways, let’s think about an example, the hazard might be. Somebody slips. Okay well while walking and all. That slip might be caused by many things it might be a wet surface. Let’s say it’s been raining, and the pavement is slippery, or it might be icy. It might be a spillage of oil on a surface, or you’d imagine something slippery like ball bearings on a surface.

So, there’s something that’s caused the surface to become slippery. A person slips – that’s the hazard. Now the person may catch themselves; they may not fall over. They may suffer no injury at all. Or they might fall and suffer a slight injury; and, very occasionally, they might suffer a severe injury. It depends on many different factors. You can imagine if you slipped while going downstairs, you’re much more likely to be injured.

And younger, healthy, fit people are more likely to get over a fall without being injured, whereas if they’re very elderly and frail, a fall can quite often result in a broken bone. If an elderly person breaks a bone in a fall the chances of them dying within the next 12 months are quite high. They’re about one in three.

So, the level of risk is sensitive to a lot of different factors. To get an accurate picture, an accurate estimate of risk, we’re going to need to factor in all those things. But before we get to that, we’ve already said that hazards need not lead to harm. In this standard, we call it an incident, where a hazard has occurred; it could have progressed to an accident but didn’t, we call this an incident. A near miss.

We got away with it. We were lucky. Whatever you want to call it. We’ve had an incident but no he’s been hurt. Hopefully, that incident is being reported, which will help us to prevent an actual accident in the future.  That’s another very useful concept that reminds us that not all hazards result in harm. Sometimes there will be no accident. There will be no harm simply because we were lucky, or because someone present took some action to prevent harm to themselves or others.

Mitigation Strategies (Controls)

But we would really like to deliberately design out or avoid Hazards if we can. What we need is a mitigation strategy, we need a measure or measures that, when we put them into practice, reduce that risk. Normally, we call these things controls. Again, now we’ve illustrated this; we’ve added to the funnels. We’ve added some mitigation strategies and they are the dark blue dashed lines.

And they are meant to represent Barriers that prevent the accident sequence from progressing towards harm. And they have dashed lines because very few controls are perfect, you know everything’s got holes in it. And we might have several of them. But usually, no control will cover all possible causes, and very few controls will deal with all possible consequences.  That’s what those barriers are meant to illustrate.

That idea that picture will be very useful to us later. When we are thinking about how we’re going to estimate and evaluate risk overall and what risk reduction we have achieved. And how we talk about justifying what we’ve done is good. That’s a very powerful illustration. Well, let’s move on to safety requirements.

Safety Requirements

Now. I guess it’s no great surprise to say that requirements, once met, can contribute directly to the safety of the system. Maybe we’ve got a safety requirement that says all cars will be fitted with seatbelts. Let’s say we’ll be required to wear a seatbelt.  That makes the system safer.

Or the requirement might be saying we need to provide evidence of the safety of the system. And, the requirement might refer to a process that we’ve got to go through or a set kind of evidence that we’ve got to provide. Safety requirements can cover either or both of these.

The Essence of System Safety

Requirements. Covering. Safety of the system or demonstrating that the system is safe. Should give us assurance, which is adequate confidence or justified confidence. Supported with evidence by following a process. And we’ll talk more about the process. We meet safety requirements. We get assurance that we’ve done the right thing. And this really brings us to the essence of what system safety is, we’ve got all these requirements – everything is a requirement really – including the requirement. To demonstrate risk reduction.

And those requirements may apply to the system itself, the product. Or they may provide, or they may apply to the process that generates the evidence or the evidence. Putting all those things together in an organized and orderly way really is the essence of system safety, this is where we are addressing safety in a systematic way, in an orderly way. In an organized way. (Those words will keep coming back). That’s the essence of system safety, as opposed to the day-to-day task of keeping a workplace safe.

Maybe by mopping up spills and providing handrails, so people don’t slip over. Things like that. We’re talking about a more sophisticated level of safety. Because we have a more complex problem a more challenging problem to deal with. That’s system safety. We will start on the process now, and we begin with hazard identification and analysis; first, we need to identify and list the hazards, the Hazards and accidents associated with the system.

We’ve got a system, physical or not. What could go wrong? We need to think about all the possibilities. And then having identified some hazards we need to start doing some analysis, we follow a process. That helps us to delve into the detail of those hazards and accidents. And to define and understand the accident sequences that could result. In fact, in doing the analysis we will very often identify some more hazards that we hadn’t thought of before, it’s not a straight-through process it tends to be an iterative process.

Risk Reduction

And ultimately what we’re trying to do is reduce risk, we want a systematic process, which is what we’re describing now. A systematic process of reducing risk. And at some point, we must estimate the risk that we’re left with. Before and after all these controls, these mitigations, are applied. That’s risk estimation.  Again, there’s that systematic word, we’re going to use all the available information to estimate the level of risk that we’ve got left. Recalling that risk is a combination of severity and likelihood.

Now as we get towards the end of the process, we need to evaluate risk against set criteria. And those criteria vary depending on which country you’re operating in or which industry we’re in: what regulations apply and what good practice is relevant. All those things can be a factor. Now, in this case, this is a U.K. standard, so we’ve got two tests for evaluating risk. It’s a systematic determination using all the available evidence. And it should be an objective evaluation as far as we can make it.

Risk Evaluation

We should use certain criteria on whether a risk can be accepted or not. And in the U.K. there are two tests for this. As we’ve said before, there is ALARP, the ‘As Low As is Reasonably Practicable’ test, which says: Have we put into practice all reasonably practicable controls? (To reduce risk, this is a risk reduction target). And then there’s an absolute level of risk to consider as well. Because even if we’ve taken all practical measures, the risk remaining might still be so high as to be unacceptable to the law.

Now that test is specific to the U.K, so we don’t have to worry too much about it. The point is there are objective criteria, which we must test ourselves or measure ourselves against. An evaluation that will pop out the decision, as to whether a further risk reduction is necessary if the risk level is still too high. We might conclude that are still reasonably practicable measures that we could take. Then we’ve got to do it.

We have an objective decision-making process to say: have we done enough to reduce risk? And if not, we need to do some more until we get to the point where we can apply the test again and say yes, we’ve done enough. Right, that’s rather a long-winded way of explaining that. I apologize, but it is a key issue and it does trip up a lot of people.

Risk Acceptance

Now, once we’ve concluded that we’ve done enough to reduce risk and no further risk reduction is necessary, somebody should be in a position to accept that risk.  Again, it’s a systematic process, by which relevant stakeholders agree that risks may be accepted. In other words, somebody with the right authority has said yes, we’re going to go ahead with the system and put it into practice, implement it. The resulting risks to people are acceptable, providing we apply the controls.

And we accept that responsibility.  Those people who are signing off on those risks are exposing themselves and/or other people to risk. Usually, they are employees, but sometimes members of the public as well, or customers. If you’re going to put customers in an airliner you’re saying yes there is a level of risk to passengers, but that the regulator, or whoever, has deemed [the risk] to be acceptable. It’s a formal process to get those risks accepted and say yes, we can proceed. But again, that varies greatly between different countries, between different industries. Depending on what regulations and laws and practices apply. (We’ll talk about different applications in another section.)

Risk Management

Now putting all this together we call this risk management.  Again, that wonderful systematic word: a systematic application of policies, procedures, and practices to these tasks. We have hazard identification, analysis, risk estimation, risk evaluation, risk reduction & risk acceptance. It’s helpful to demonstrate that we’ve got a process here, where we go through these things in order. Now, this is a simplified picture because it kind of implies that you just go through the process once.

With a complex system, you go through the process at least once. We may identify further hazards when we get into Hazard Analysis and estimating risk. In the process of trying to do those things, even as late as applying controls and getting to risk acceptance. We may discover that we need to do additional work. We may try and apply controls and discover the controls that we thought were going to be effective are not effective.

Our evaluation of the level of risk and its acceptability is wrong because it was based on the premise that controls would be effective, and we’ve discovered that they’re not, so we must go back and redo some work. Maybe as we go through, we even discover Hazards that we hadn’t anticipated before. This can and does happen, it’s not necessarily a straight-through process. We can iterate through this process. Perhaps several times, while we are moving forward.

Safety Management

OK, Safety Management. We’ve gone to a higher level really than risk because we’re thinking about requirements as well as risk. We’re going to apply organization, we’re going to apply management principles to achieve safety with high confidence. For the first time, we’ve introduced this idea of confidence in what we’re doing. Well, I say the first time, this is insurance isn’t it? Assurance, having justified confidence, or appropriate confidence because we’ve got the evidence. And that might be product evidence too we might have tested the product to show that it’s safe.

We might have analyzed it. We might have said well we’ve shown that we follow the process that gives us confidence that our evidence is good. And we’ve done all the right things and identified all the risks.  That’s safety management. We need to put that in a safety management system, we’ve got a defined organizational structure, and we have defined processes, procedures, and methods. That gives us direction and control of all the activities that we need to put together in combination to effectively meet safety requirements and safety policy.

And our safety tests, whatever they might be. More and more now we’re thinking about top-level organization and planning to achieve the outcomes we need. With a complex system, a complex operating environment, and a complex application.

Safety Planning

Now I’ll just mention planning. Okay, we need a safety management plan that defines the strategy: how we’re going to get there, how are we going to address safety. We need to document that safety management system for a specific project. Planning is very important for effective safety. Safety is very vulnerable to poor planning. If a project is badly planned or not planned at all, it becomes very difficult to Do safety effectively, because we are dependent on the process, on following a rigorous process to give us confidence that all results are correct.  If you’ve got a project that is a bit haphazard, that’s not going to help you achieve the objectives.

Planning is important. Now the bit of that safety plan that deals with timescales, milestones, and other date-related information. We might refer to it as a safety program. Now being a UK Definition, British English has two spellings of program. The double-m-e-version of programme. Applies to that time-based progression, or milestone-based progression.

Whereas in the US and in Australia, for example, we don’t have those two words we just have the one word, ‘program’. Which Covers everything: computer programs, a program of work that might have nothing to do with or might not be determined by timescales or milestones. Or one that is. But the point is that certain things may have to happen at certain points in time or before certain milestones. We may need to demonstrate safety before we are allowed to proceed to tests and trials or before we are allowed to put our system into service.

Demonstrating Safety

We’ve got to demonstrate that Safety has been achieved before we expose people to risk.  That’s very simple. Now, finally, we’re almost at the end. Now we need to provide a demonstration – maybe to a regulator, maybe to customers – that we have achieved safety.  This standard uses the concept of a safety case. The safety case is basically, imagine a portfolio full of evidence.  We’ve got a structured argument to put it all together. We’ve got a body of evidence that supports the argument.

It provides a Compelling, Comprehensible (or understandable), and valid case that a system is safe. For a given application or use, in a given Operating environment.  Really, that definition of what a safety case is, harks back to that meaning of safety.  We’ve got something that really hits the nail on the head. And we might put all of that together and summarise it in a safety case report. That summarises those arguments and evidence, and documents progress against the Safe program.

Remember I said our planning was important. We started off by saying that we need to do this, that the other in order to achieve safety. Hopefully, in the end, in the safety report, we’ll be able to state that we’ve done exactly that. We did do all those things. We did follow the process rigorously. We’ve got good results. We’ve got a robust safety argument. With evidence to support it. In the end, it’s all written up in a report.

Documenting Safety

Now that isn’t always going to be called a safety case report; it might be called a safety assessment report or a design justification report. There are lots of names for these things. But they all tend to do the same kind of thing, where they pull together the argument as to why the system is safe. The evidence to support the argument, document progress against a plan or some set of process requirements from a standard or a regulator or just good practice in industry to say: Yes, we’ve done what we were expected to do.

The result is usually that’s what justifies [the system] getting past that milestone. Where the system is going into service and can be used. People can be exposed to those risks, but safely and under control.

Everyone’s a winner, as they say!

Copyright – Creative Commons Licence

Okay. I’ve used a lot of information from a UK government website. I’ve done that in accordance with the terms of its creative commons license, and you can see more about that here. We have complied with that, as we are required to, and to say to you that the information we’ve supplied is under the terms of this license.

Safety Concepts Part 2: More Resources

And for more resources and for more lessons on system safety. And other safe topics. I invite you to visit the safety artisan.com website  Thanks very much for watching. I hope you found that useful.

We’ve covered a lot of information there, but hopefully in a structured way. We’ve repeated the key concepts and you can see that in that standard. The key concepts are consistently defined, and they reinforce each other. In order to get that systematic, disciplined approach to safety, that’s what we need.

Anyway, that’s enough for me. I hope you enjoyed watching it and found that useful. I look forward to talking to you again soon. Please send me some feedback about what you thought about this video and also what you would like to see covered in the future.

Thank you for visiting The Safety Artisan. I look forward to talking to you again soon. Goodbye.

Safety Concepts Part 1 defines the meaning of ‘Safe’, and it is free. Get the full-length lesson for free HERE.